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INTRODUCTION 
Copyright law in the United States is predominantly based on 
utilitarian justifications.1  According to such justifications, 
copyright is aimed to benefit society as a whole.2  The main 
projection of utilitarian justifications for copyright in U.S. law is in 
the U.S. Constitution, according to which Congress has the power 
to legislate copyright laws in order “to promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts.”3  The emphasis on utilitarian 
 
*  LL.B. (1996), LL.D. (2003), Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Lecturer, College of 
Management Academic Studies Law School, and Faculties of Law, Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv University, Israel.  The author wishes to thank Michael 
Birnhack, Guy Pessach, and Tamir Afori for their helpful comments. 
1 See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE § 1.1, ¶ 4 
(1989); Paul Edward Geller, Must Copyright Be Forever Caught Between Marketplace 
and Authorship Norms?, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS: ESSAYS ON COPYRIGHT LAW 159, 
159 (Brad Sherman & Alain Strowel eds., 1994) (“Anglo-American copyright laws, in 
the usual course of affairs, rely on marketplace norms.”); Barbara S. Murphy, Note & 
Comment, The Wind Done Gone: Parody or Piracy?  A Comment on Suntrust Bank v. 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 567, 571 (2002) (“U.S. copyright law 
derives from the English, utilitarian theme by proposing to advance creative expression 
for the benefit of the public at large by granting a copyright to the individual author as 
both an economic incentive and a reward. . . . The ultimate aim was to promote broad 
public availability of literature, music, and the arts for the public good.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
2 See id. 
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
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justifications in the Constitution has greatly influenced the 
development of copyright law.4 
The purpose of this Essay is to shed light on another “super-
norm,” an alternative kind of constitutional norm that might be 
taken into consideration while shaping copyright law.  This refers 
to article 27 (“Article 27”) of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (“Universal Declaration”),5 adopted and proclaimed by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948.6  
Article 27 proclaims as follows: 
1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural 
life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in 
scientific advancement and its benefits. 
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and 
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or 
artistic production of which he is the author.7 
The underpinnings of the Universal Declaration are from the 
field of natural law theory, namely philosophical justifications that 
are concerned with individual benefit rather than societal benefit.8  
The question to be addressed in this Essay is whether Article 27 of 
the Universal Declaration, along with its theoretical infrastructure, 
 
4 One of the central examples of such impact is the Feist decision where the Court 
interpreted the constitutional Copyright Clause as decisive for rejecting the “sweat of the 
brow” doctrine, namely, that investment of labor and effort by authors does not in itself 
justify a grant of copyright. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 
354 (1991) (stating that “sweat of the brow” flouted basic copyright principles and that 
while copyright protection for labor may be appropriate under certain unfair competition 
principles, applying such protection solely on this basis “creates a monopoly in public 
domain materials without the necessary justification of protecting and encouraging the 
creation of ‘writings’ by ‘authors’” (quotations omitted)). 
5 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 
Supp. No. 16, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), available at http://www.un.org/-
Overview/rights.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2004) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. 
6 See id. 
7 Id. 
8 See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and 
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1544 
(1993) [hereinafter Gordon, Property Right in Self-Expression] (“As individuals we can 
take actions that cause us to deserve more or less than these fundamental human 
entitlements would dictate.  Most notably, if we work productively, our labor may entitle 
us to own more goods than less industrious people are entitled to have.”). 
4 AFORI FORMAT 3/31/2004  4:13 PM 
500 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 14:497 
 
can influence American copyright law.  Article 27 can be used as a 
conduit to introduce natural law considerations into American 
copyright law.  For a long time there has been an ongoing debate 
on whether the justifications of copyright are utilitarian only or a 
merger of utilitarian and natural law justifications instead.9  This 
Essay will not discuss those questions.  The sole aim is to point out 
a normative source that may be used as a means to introduce 
natural law perceptions into American copyright law in a balanced 
way.  To be clear, the proposition of this Essay is instrumental in 
character and is aimed to reveal a new legal mechanism for 
introducing natural law philosophies into the copyright discourse, 
but not to re-evaluate such justifications. 
Even though Article 27 of the Universal Declaration might 
have great importance in the field of art and culture, it has been 
completely ignored in copyright discourse in the United States.10  
A better comprehension of the complex interests expressed in 
Article 27 might influence its acceptance as a normative source in 
the domestic field.  Article 27 embraces a balance of interests 
between authors’ proprietary rights over their works and the rights 
of other members of society to enjoy these works.11  Thus, the 
introduction of natural law considerations through Article 27 need 
not necessarily sway the balance in favor of authors; it might even 
advance the rights of members of society to enjoy works, and 
hence will contribute to copyright restraint.  As a result, using 
Article 27 as a medium of introduction of natural law 
 
9 For examples of such debate, see Geller, supra note 1; Gordon, Property Right in 
Self-Expression, supra note 8, at 1607–08 (stating that “it remains to be specified what 
relationship should exist between natural rights arguments and the various other norms 
our law appropriately recognizes, particularly economic or utilitarian consequentialism”); 
Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 517 (1990) (presenting a view that natural law should be restored to modern 
copyright jurisprudence to reflect the historical development of copyright law in which 
there has been a presence of both natural law and economic theory). 
10 Present research indicates that U.S. copyright law has not been challenged in U.S. 
courts with arguments based on article 27 (“Article 27”) of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (“Universal Declaration”).  Additionally, Article 27 is completely 
neglected in academic discourse.  For more on the neglect of rights contained in Article 
27, see infra note 55. 
11 Göran Melander, Article 27, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A 
COMMENTARY 429, 430 (Asbjørn Eide et al. eds., 1992). 
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considerations into domestic copyright law can contribute to the 
development of copyright law in a balanced way, by enriching the 
different considerations taken into account. 
Nevertheless, prima facie, the proposed use of Article 27 of the 
Universal Declaration may be problematic in the United States due 
to the Constitution’s copyright clause (“Copyright Clause”),12 
according to which utilitarian consideration should be taken into 
account in legislating copyright law.13  In other words, the question 
is whether the Copyright Clause (dictating utilitarian 
considerations) proscribes the proposed use of Article 27 
(reflecting natural law considerations).  As this Essay shall explain 
at length, the utilitarian values, as reflected in the Copyright Clause 
can be reconciled with natural law values to some extent.  
Therefore, the Copyright Clause does not have to be understood as 
a total exclusion of naturalistic perceptions.  Moreover, the 
universal human right—the super-norm—can be a source of 
inspiration to infuse U.S. standards, reflected in the Constitution 
and in statutes.  Consequently, Article 27 can function as a 
supplementary source of consideration for inserting natural law 
considerations into American copyright law. 
Part I of this Essay presents the legal instruments and doctrines 
that will be used in Part II, in order to outline the proposal.  Part I 
will briefly explain the theoretical dichotomy in copyright 
underpinnings and contains an in-depth analysis of Article 27 of 
the Universal Declaration.  Part II of this Essay contains an 
application of the proposal according to which Article 27 can be 
used to introduce natural law considerations into American 
copyright law.  It sketches the proposed mechanism enabled via 
Article 27 and concentrates on resolving the problems posed by the 
U.S. Constitution. 
 
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
13 See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] 
(2003) (“The primary purpose of copyright is not to reward the author, but is rather to 
secure ‘the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.’” (citing 
N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 121 S.Ct. 2381, 2401 (2001)). 
4 AFORI FORMAT 3/31/2004  4:13 PM 
502 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 14:497 
 
I.  HUMAN RIGHTS AND COPYRIGHT 
 The final aim of this Essay is to propose a mechanism that 
enables to introduce natural law considerations into American 
copyright law. To this end, the essential components for 
constructing such a mechanism will be presented in the following 
first part of the Article.  Thus, the general debate over copyright 
underpinnings will be briefly presented, followed by a more 
thorough presentation of the human rights’ international norm to 
be used in the framework of the proposition regarding the 
introduction of human rights discourse into the copyright scheme. 
A. Justifications for Copyright 
One common justification for copyright is based on utilitarian 
considerations.14  Copyright, like any other property right, is aimed 
to benefit as many people as possible in society and, as a result, to 
benefit society as a whole.15  Concentrating on public welfare, and 
not on the individual, means that there is a justification for 
copyright as long as it benefits the public.16  Aside from the 
utilitarian theory, however, there are philosophical and moral 
theories which center on the individual.17  The basic idea in those 
 
14 See id. 
15 For a general discussion on the utilitarian theory and its justifications for property 
rights, see LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 57–67 
(1977); JAMES W. HARRIS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 36–48 (1st ed. 1980); STEPHEN R. 
MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 196–98 (1990). 
16 See 1 COPINGER AND SKONE JAMES ON COPYRIGHT 15 (Kevin Garnett et al. eds., 14th 
ed. 1999) [hereinafter COPINGER]; GILLIAN DAVIES, COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST 7–11 (VCH Publishers 1st ed.1994); Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the 
Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement 
Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1438 (1989) (discussing the view taken by many 
economically oriented commentators that a person could only claim property rights for 
their creation if those rights would help the public) [hereinafter Gordon, Inquiry into 
Copyright Merits].  For more information about a utilitarian justification for copyright, 
see J.A.L. STERLING, WORLD COPYRIGHT LAW 56–62 (1st ed. 1998); Robert M. Hurt & 
Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56 AM. ECON. REV., 
PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 421 (1966); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An 
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989). 
17 See JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 13 (1988); see also 
Jonathan Drimmer, Hate Property: A Substantive Limitation for America’s Cultural 
Property Laws, 65 TENN. L. REV. 691, 728–31 (1998) (discussing Locke’s labor theory 
and Hegel’s personality theory, both of which focus on the individual). 
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theories is that human beings have fundamental interests, which 
should not be sacrificed for public benefit, and that society’s well-
being does not override those interests.18  Protecting those interests 
is deemed vital for maintaining individual autonomy, 
independence, and security.19  Acknowledgment of these interests, 
which are vital for the individual, has led to the emergence of the 
term “natural right”20 and the development of theories that justify 
the natural property right conferred on individuals.21  The 
naturalistic character of the right does not mean that a person is 
born with it; rather it means that other people—society—
acknowledge the right morally or rationally even though there is no 
positive rule establishing the right.22  Thus, a natural right stems 
from the nature of human kind.23 
Two central theories that are a part of general natural law 
theories are the labor theory and the personality theory.24  These 
theories explain the nature of interest that an author has with 
regard to his or her work and, as a result, justify the assertion of 
 
18 Id. at 728 (“Traditionally, to own private property is to have individual, exclusive 
rights to possess, use, and dispose of that property as seen fit.”). 
19 Id. (“Western property theories traditionally embrace private, individual ownership 
schemes, deemed to ‘represent[] and protect[] the sphere of legitimate, absolute 
individual autonomy.’” (citations omitted)). 
20 See WALDRON, supra note 17, at 19. 
21 For a discussion of such theories, see id. at 13. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 19. 
24 Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT  L. REV. 
609, 610 (1993) (describing the Lockean labor theory and the Hegelian personality theory 
as strong justifications for intellectual property); Michael D. Birnhack, Copyright Law 
and Free Speech After Eldred v. Ashcroft, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275, 1293 (2003) 
(describing the Lockean labor theory as “a ‘just rewards’ intuition” and the Hegelian 
personality theory as emphasizing a “personal connection between a person and a 
physical object that embodies his or her free will”); Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying 
Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31, 36, 45  (1989) [hereinafter Hettinger, 
Justifying Intellectual Property] (“Perhaps the most powerful intuition supporting 
property rights is that people are entitled to the fruits of their labor. . . . Private property 
can be justified as a means to sovereignty.  Dominion over certain objects is important for 
individual autonomy.”); see also Gordon, Property Right in Self-Expression, supra note 
8, at 1544 (describing the Lockean labor theory as based, inter alia, on the notion of 
“desert”). 
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that right.25  Briefly, according to the labor theory, the justification 
for copyright is based on the assumption that the author has a 
natural right in the fruits of his or her labor.26  This justification is 
a development of a general and common justification for property 
rights, ascribed in the literature mainly to philosopher John 
Locke.27  According to Locke, every person has a right over his or 
her body, hence, also a right over the fruits of his or her labor.28  
The product of a person’s labor, which is the result of labor 
investment with respect to resources that are part of the public 
domain, is that person’s property.29  The personality theory, like 
the labor theory, deals with the natural justification of ownership 
over assets.30  The claim is that a person’s control over assets 
expresses that person’s personality and inner will, and that these 
are necessary for the realization of autonomy, freedom, and 
confidence.31  In order to enable proper self-development, the 
individual needs control over the surrounding resources.32  
Sometimes, the self-determination of a person is done via external 
objects.33  In this context, acknowledging the right to property 
 
25 See Gordon, Property Right in Self-Expression, supra note 8, at 1544 (“To the extent 
that [the Lockean] theory purports to state a nonconsequentialist natural right in property, 
it is most firmly based on the most fundamental law of nature, the ‘no harm principle.’”). 
26 See Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, supra note 24. 
27 See infra note 29 and accompanying text. 
28 See Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, supra note 24, at 37 (“A person owns 
her body and hence she owns what it does, namely, its labor.  A person’s labor and its 
product are inseparable, and so ownership of one can be secured only by owning the 
other.  Hence, if a person is to own her body and thus its labor, she must also own what 
she joins her labor with—namely, the product of her labor.”). 
29 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON CIVIL GOV’T (London, Routledge 1884).  For a 
general overview of Locke’s ideas, see HUNTINGTON CAIRNS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM 
PLATO TO HEGEL 35–36 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1949).  For the labor justification for 
property rights, see BECKER, supra note 15, at 32–56; MUNZER, supra note 15, at 37–58; 
WALDRON, supra note  17, at 137–253. 
30 See infra note 35 and accompanying text. 
31 MARGARET J. RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 44–48 (1993) [hereinafter RADIN, 
REINTERPRETING PROPERTY]; WALDRON, supra note 17, at 20, 377–78; Hettinger, 
Justifying Intellectual Property, supra note 24; Margaret J. Radin, Property and 
Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957–59 (1982) [hereinafter Radin, Property and 
Personhood]. 
32 Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 31, at 957. 
33 See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 333 
(1988) (“Mental processes—such as recognizing, classifying, explaining, and 
remembering—can be viewed as appropriations of the external world by the mind.  
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answers the expectation of a person for continuous control over his 
or her external identity.34  The personality theory functions also as 
an explanation for copyright, because the work reflects the 
personal expression, will, and identity of the author in the external 
world.  Thus, the author should be given control over the work that 
represents the external expression of his or her personality.35 
In European, or continental countries, the theories justifying 
the author’s natural right with respect to his or her work have great 
impact on copyright law.36  In the United Kingdom and the United 
States, natural right theories were used alongside utilitarian 
theories as a basis for justifying copyright.37  The U.S. Supreme 
 
Cognition and resulting knowledge, however, are the world imposing itself upon the 
mind. The will is not bound by these impressions.  It seeks to appropriate the external 
world in a different way—by imposing itself upon the world.”); see also WALDRON, 
supra note 17, at 352–55; Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 31, at 961–62. 
34 Hughes, supra note 33, at 333; Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 31, at 
968. 
35 This idea is mainly ascribed in literature to Hegel. See GEORG HEGEL, HEGEL’S 
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (Thomas M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press, 1942), available at 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/prindex.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).  
For a brief overview of Hegel’s ideas, see CAIRNS, supra note 29, at 517–23.  For 
justifications of property rights and copyright according to Hegel’s theory, see BECKER, 
supra note 15, at 29–30; PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 73–
90 (Dartmouth 1996); MUNZER, supra note 15, at 67–70; WALDRON, supra note 17, at 20; 
Hughes, supra note 33, at 332–38; Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 31, at 
971; Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 
1239–42 (1996). 
36 ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
AGE 4 (2d ed. 1997); STEPHEN M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND 
NEIGHBORING RIGHTS 6, 24–27 (2d ed. 1989). 
37 Many scholars hold the opinion that the theoretical basis of Anglo-American 
copyright law is dualistic, and that utilitarian and natural rights theories are used in 
combination. See, e.g., MERGES, supra note 36, at 4; Benjamin G. Damstedt, Limiting 
Locke: A Natural Law Justification for the Fair Use Doctrine, 112 YALE L.J. 1179, 1179 
(2003) (“Courts also have a long history of using natural law justifications in intellectual 
property cases”) (citation omitted); Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: 
Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1874 (1990) 
(“[T]hroughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, the concept of original 
authorship embraced both original labor and original creative activity.”); Gordon, 
Property Right in Self-Expression, supra note 9; Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in 
Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1199 (1996) [hereinafter Sterk, Rhetoric and 
Reality] (“Early American enactments also focused on these twin goals: assuring authors 
their just deserts and encouraging authors to create and disseminate works of social 
value. . . . Over the ensuing two centuries, as copyright protection has expanded, each 
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Court decision rendered in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural 
Telephone Service Co.,38 however, was a significant turning point.  
According to the Feist decision, labor is not enough to confer 
proprietary rights to the author.39  Furthermore, according to the 
Feist decision, labor investment does not replace the minimal 
degree of originality that is necessary for enjoying copyright.40  
The Feist decision mainly turned on the Copyright Clause, which 
empowers Congress to legislate copyright law in order to promote 
science and useful arts for the benefit of society.41  The 
interpretation given to the Copyright Clause by the Supreme Court 
was that copyright protection was granted on the condition that 
there existed some originality, and this condition was articulated as 
a certain creativeness beyond mere labor investment.42  In contrast 
with the Feist decision, the labor theory is still in force in the 
United Kingdom and in other Anglo-Commonwealth 
jurisprudences.43 
 
expansion has been accompanied by rhetoric championing the needs of the deserving 
author, emphasizing the need to induce creative activity, or both.”) (citations omitted); 
Alfred C. Yen, The Interdisciplinary Future of Copyright Theory, in THE CONSTRUCTION 
OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE 159, 161–62 (Martha 
Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as 
Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 
33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 690–703 (1992) (discussing the strong natural law 
influence on early intellectual property law in the United States and England). 
38 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
39 See id. at 352 (rejecting the “sweat of the brow” doctrine and requiring a showing of 
originality for copyright protection). 
40 Id. at 340–41. 
41 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
42 Feist, 499 U.S. at 340. 
43 See COPINGER, supra note 16, at 30; REPORT OF THE COMM. TO CONSIDER THE LAW 
ON COPYRIGHT AND DESIGNS (WHITFORD REPORT), 1977, CMND 6732, at 3.  It should be 
explained that although the seminal decision in the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 
1 E.R. 837, has stressed utilitarian justifications for copyright, naturalistic justifications 
were never abandoned.  For example, see the decision held by the House of Lords in 
Ladbrook (Football) Ltd., v. William Hill (Football) Ltd., [1964] 1 W.L.R. 273, 277–78, 
according to which labor investment is a relevant threshold for conferring copyright.  
Recently, the appeals court of Australia laid down a decision according to which English 
law must be adopted continually, so labor theory continues to be a justification of 
copyright. See Desktop Mktg. Sys. Pty. Ltd. v. Telstra Corp. Ltd. (2002) 192 A.L.R. 433.  
In this case it was held that a telephone directory was copyrightable. 
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B. Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
The natural rights discourse is the background on which the 
human rights legal discipline developed.44  This legal discipline 
mainly deals with the legal means to realize natural rights.45  From 
human rights discourse emerged the recognition of “universal 
human rights.”46  The acknowledgment of fundamental basic 
rights, given to human beings wherever they are, reflects a wide 
philosophical and political position concerning the place of the 
individual in society and the need to entitle the individual with 
certain basic liberties.47  An expression of universal human rights 
may be found in the constitutions of several different countries48 
and in treaties and international declarations regarding human 
rights.  One of the most central sources for the recognition of 
global human rights is the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.49 
The Universal Declaration is the fruit of philosophical and 
moral justifications of basic human rights, but in some ways has 
become the moral decree itself.  The natural liberties that have an 
impact on positive rights are those acknowledged in countries’ 
constitutions, treaties, and international declarations; they are not 
those that are completely theoretical or which deal with a primeval 
world with no legal order at all.50  Thus, the status and the great 
 
44 LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 1 (1st ed. 1990) [hereinafter HENKIN, AGE OF 
RIGHTS]. 
45 Therefore, the Human Rights discipline could not be classified as a “theory” standing 
on its own, because it does not give additional theoretical justification for acknowledging 
natural rights.  For the position that the human rights legal movement is based on 
different values but is not in itself a philosophical theory, see id. at 1–2, 6, 31. 
46 Jerome J. Shestack, The Jurisprudence of Human Rights, in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 69, 70–74 (Theodor Meron ed., 1985). 
47 Discussion over the theoretical basis of universal human rights is beyond the scope 
of this Essay.  It should be noted, however, that natural rights theories served as the main 
cause, although not the exclusive one, for the development of universal human rights. See 
id. at 85–101. 
48 HENKIN, AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 45, at 26–29. 
49 See supra note 5. 
50 Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in 
Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 842, 869–70 (1993).  The Universal 
Declaration manifests the general legal movement of human rights in concrete and 
applicable terms. See Louis Henkin, The Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge 
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influence of the Universal Declaration turned it into a quasi-
justification in itself for different human rights.51 
Intellectual property rights, and in particular copyright, are also 
treated in the framework of the Universal Declaration.52  As cited 
previously, Article 27(2) of the Universal Declaration states that 
the material and moral interests of the author with respect to his or 
her work should be protected.53  In further protection of the 
author’s rights, Article 27(1) proclaims a basic and universal right, 
according to which “[e]veryone has the right freely to participate in 
the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in 
scientific advancement and its benefits.”54  Thus, Article 27(1) 
includes a range of  different rights, from freedom of creation to 
the right to enjoy existing works.55  The aim of Article 27(1) is to 
make it clear that culture must be within everyone’s reach and, 
therefore, it must be possible not only to access culture but to 
participate in its creation as well.56  This is a reason for referring to 
the rights proclaimed in Article 27(1) as rights of “access and 
participation.”57 
Article 27 of the Universal Declaration, then, is comprised of 
two parts, which together grant a package of rights called “cultural 
 
of Global Markets, 25 BROOK. J. OF INT’L L. 17, 18–19 (1999) [hereinafter Henkin, 
Universal Declaration at 50]. 
51 The Universal Declaration is deemed to be the prime document and constitution of 
the human rights movement, with a symbolic and ideological status. See HENRY J. 
STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, 
MORALS: TEXT AND MATERIALS 138–39 (2d ed. 2000). 
52 Universal Declaration, supra note 5. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Francois Dessemontet, Copyright and Human Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND INFORMATION LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HERMAN COHEN JEHORAM 113, 117 (Jan 
J.C. Kabel & Gerald J.H.M. Mom eds., 1998). 
56 See Audrey R. Chapman, A Human Right Perspective on Intellectual Property, 
Scientific Progress, and Access to the Benefits of Science, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 127, 132 (1999). 
57 See Mehmet Komurcu, Cultural Heritage Endangered by Large Dams and Its 
Protection Under International Law, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 233, 276–77 (2002) (discussing 
Article 27 and recognizing a person’s “right to participation in culture” and that “cultural 
rights should give priority to access to, and education about one’s own culture”) 
(emphasis added). 
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rights.”58  This bundle of cultural rights includes the right to 
participate in cultural life, the freedom of creation, the right to 
enjoy culture, the right to enjoy the products of scientific progress, 
the freedom of scientific research, and the economic and moral 
rights the author has with respect to his or her work.59 
It should be noted that after the acceptance of the Universal 
Declaration, the United Nations (U.N.) decided to formulate 
treaties on the issues related to the Universal Declaration.60  
Accordingly, in 1966 two treaties were formed: one dealing with 
civil and political rights and the other with economic, social, and 
cultural rights.61  The package of cultural rights, proclaimed in 
Article 27, was acknowledged in the treaty regarding economic, 
social, and cultural rights.62  The United States, however, is not a 
 
58 Ragnar Adalsteinsson & Páll Thórhallson, Article 27, in THE UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMON STANDARD OF ACHIEVEMENT 575 
(Gudmundur Alfredsson & Asbjørn Eide eds., 1999) (“Article 27 is usually said to 
proclaim cultural rights.”). 
59 Id.; Yoram Dinstein, Cultural Rights, 9 ISRAEL YEARBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS 58 
(1979). 
60 See infra notes 61–64 and accompanying text. 
61 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. 
No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).  Besides those two treaties, in 1966 another 
declaration was made regarding the need for international cooperation on cultural issues. 
See UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION 
(“UNESCO”), DECLARATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL CO-
OPERATION, reprinted in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
INSTRUMENTS 595 (1994). 
62 Article 15(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
states that: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone: (a) 
To take part in cultural life; (b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and 
its applications; (c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material 
interest resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he 
is the author. 
Article 15(2) of said covenant stipulates that the states parties are bound to take steps to 
promote said cultural rights.  Article 15(2) is compatible with the general policy of the 
covenant, according to which the rights in the states parties are not “guaranteed,” and that 
the states parties should take measures to realize the rights, as part of an ongoing process. 
See MATTHEW C.R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 106–52 (1995); David M. 
Trubek, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the Third World: Human Rights Law 
and Human Needs Program, in 2 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND 
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party to this treaty.63  Moreover, the cultural rights were also 
established almost identically in the 1948 American Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of Man, adopted by the Organization of 
American States, of which the United States is a member nation.64 
C. The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
The Universal Declaration is not a treaty that states are parties 
to; rather, it is a declaration proclaiming universal rights that 
everyone should have wherever they are.65  The declaration is not 
aimed to bind states in particular, but rather society as a whole.66  
The original intent of the framers of the Universal Declaration, at 
least of some of them, was that it would have mainly moral force 
and would be used as a source of inspiration and guidance in the 
 
POLICY ISSUES 205, 210, 212–14 (Theodor Meron ed., 1985).  Article 15(3) stipulates that 
“[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to respect the freedom 
indispensable for scientific research and creative activity.” 
63 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).  The United States 
is not a party to this treaty. 
64 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, 
International Conference of American States, 9th Conf., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser. L/V/I.4 
Rev. XX (1948).  According to article XIII of the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man: 
Every person has the right to take part in the cultural life of the community, to 
enjoy the arts and to participate in the benefits that result from intellectual 
progress, especially scientific discoveries. 
He likewise has the right to the protection of his moral and material interests as 
regards his inventions or any literary, scientific or artistic works of which he is 
the author. 
Id.  It should be noted that this declaration precedes the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. 
65 See Gudmundur Alfredsson & Asbjørn Eide, Introduction to THE UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMON STANDARD OF ACHIEVEMENT xxx 
(Gudmundur Alfredsson & Asbjørn Eide eds., 1999) (“[The Universal Declaration] is not 
a convention subject to the ratification and accession requirements foreseen for treaties.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that [it] . . . carries legal weight far beyond that of ordinary 
resolutions or even other declarations emanating from the General Assembly [of the 
United Nations].”).   
66 The framers of the Universal Declaration had an internal conflict on the question of 
whether it was best to shape it as an international covenant, which binds countries, or as a 
declaration, which has moral force only.  Finally, the second option was adopted, with the 
support of different countries, including the United States and the (then) U.S.S.R. ASHILD 
SAMNØY, HUMAN RIGHTS AS INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS: THE MAKING OF THE 
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1945–1948, 57–67 (1993). 
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field of human rights.67  At the time the Universal Declaration was 
formulated, however, there was no consent between its supporting 
states on its legal force.68  The superpowers of that time, the United 
States and the Soviet Union, as well as other states such as Great 
Britain and China, held that the Universal Declaration was only a 
moral source of inspiration and nothing more.69  Other states, such 
as France, Chile, and Lebanon, held the opposite position, that the 
Universal Declaration was a continuation of the U.N. Charter, and 
hence, had binding legal force.70  More than that, many countries 
announced their obligation to the Universal Declaration, simply 
due to its importance.71  Therefore, the legal status of the Universal 
Declaration is controversial.  Some hold the view that despite its 
moral importance it does not have binding status, while others hold 
the view that it reflects binding law, either because it continues the 
U.N. Charter or because it is part of customary international law.72  
Even if the Universal Declaration has not become part of 
customary international law, however, at least it should have 
impact on interpreting domestic laws, due to its position as a moral 
 
67 The original framers who shared this view included the United States, China, 
Australia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, the Union of South Africa, 
and the United Kingdom. Id. at 70–72. 
68 Id. at 77 (“In the end, the Declaration was adopted with a variety of views on its 
legal value.”). 
69 Id. at 70–72. 
70 Id. at 76 (“Chile, France and Lebanon were the leading forces among those who saw 
the Declaration as binding.”). 
71 Henkin, Universal Declaration at 50, supra note 50, at 21. 
72 PAUL SEIGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 14–19 (1983). For the 
status of the Universal Declaration in various countries, including the United States, and 
for the position that it has become part of customary international law, see Hurst 
Hannum, The Status and Future of the Customary International Law of Human Rights: 
The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International 
Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287, 298, 301, 304–07, 322–24 (1995/1996). See also 
SAMNØY, supra note 66, at 128–30; Richard B. Lillich, Invoking International Human 
Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 394 (1985) (quoting one of the 
drafters of the Universal Declaration stating that “the Declaration has been invoked so 
many times both within and without the United Nations that lawyers now are saying that, 
whatever the intention of its authors may have been, the Declaration is now part of the 
customary law of nations and therefore is binding on all states”).  For more on this issue, 
see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
701–02 (1987) (invoking an obligation upon states to respect human rights and listing the 
customary international law of human rights) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS]. 
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source of inspiration.73  The fact that the status of the Universal 
Declaration is not assimilated into a binding treaty does not mean 
that any state simply can ignore it.74 
In any case, the Universal Declaration manifests a variety of 
human rights, from basic freedoms to social and economic rights.75  
Therefore, it is not made of one cloth, and a separate discussion 
can be held regarding the status of each one of the different rights 
included therein.  For the purposes of the discussion here, it is 
assumed that Article 27 is of an inspirational nature.76 
D. The Right to Participate in Cultural Life as a Human Right 
The right to participate in cultural life is included in the 
package of cultural rights proclaimed in Article27(1) of the 
Universal Declaration.77  The research on the right to participate in 
cultural life is limited.78  Different declarations and treaties are 
 
73 Pieter van Dijk, The Universal Declaration Is Legally Non-Binding: So What?, in 
REFLECTIONS ON THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A FIFTIETH 
ANNIVERSARY ANTHOLOGY 108, 109 (Barend van der Heijden & Bahia Tahzib-Lie eds., 
1998).  For Tony Blair’s opinion on the practical aspects of the Universal Declaration, 
see Tony Blair, The Universal Declaration as a Source of Inspiration, in REFLECTIONS ON 
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY ANTHOLOGY 
65 (Barend van der Heijden & Bahia Tahzib-Lie eds., 1998). See also Edward D. Re, The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Domestic Courts, 14 ST. THOMAS L. 
REV. 665, 680–81, 685–86 (2002) (discussing the moral and legal effect of the Universal 
Declaration, and the role of domestic courts in following the spirit of the Universal 
Declaration, inter alia, through interpretation of domestic statutes and constitutional 
provisions). 
74 Oscar Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Non-Binding International Agreements, 
71 AM. J. INT’L L. 296, 298 (1977); van Dijk, supra note 73, at 108. 
75 See Universal Declaration, supra note 5. 
76 Such view was held, obiter dictum, with respect to Article 27 of the Universal 
Declaration in a case discussing the status of the right to free elementary education, 
proclaimed in article 26(1). See In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 593 
(S.D. Tex. 1980), aff’d sub nom. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (It should be noted 
that the reference in this case was made to Article 27(1), but the wording of Article 27(2) 
was quoted.).  For scholarly acceptance of such a conclusion, see Lillich, supra note 72, 
at 407 n.189. 
77 See Universal Declaration, supra note 5 (“[e]veryone has the right freely to 
participate in the cultural life of the community”). 
78 This situation was described by leading commentators as “clear neglect of the 
specifically economic and social rights dimensions of cultural rights.” Steiner & Alston, 
supra note 51, at 248.  “Cultural rights are [also] often qualified as an ‘underdeveloped 
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some of the available tools for clarifying its content.79  Reference 
to the content and interpretation of said right may be found in the 
U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s 
(“UNESCO”) 1986 recommendation titled Participation by the 
People at Large in Cultural Life and Their Contribution to It.80  In 
this recommendation, UNESCO determined that there are two key 
terms in this context: 
(1) Access to Culture: This is defined as “the concrete 
opportunities available to everyone, in particular through 
the creation of the appropriate socio-economic conditions, 
 
category’ of human rights.” See HUMAN RIGHTS: CONCEPTS AND STANDARDS 175 (Janusz 
Symonides ed., 2000) [hereinafter Symonides, HUMAN RIGHTS]. 
79 There are many declarations and treaties dealing with the subject of “cultural rights.”  
Despite the existence of these international legal instruments, it has been claimed that the 
international institutes responsible for their implementation have not made an effort to 
interpret them or to stimulate international discourse on the issue. See Chapman, supra 
note 56, at 134.  For a review of the acts taken by UNESCO in order to promote the 
cultural rights discourse and implementation, see Symonides, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 
78, at 176–79.  The following are some international instruments referring to the subject 
of “cultural rights”: 
(1) The Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Co-Operation, 
supra note 61, proclaims in article 1(2) that, “Every people has the right and the 
duty to develop its culture.” Id.  Article 7(1) of this declaration proclaims that, 
“[b]road dissemination of ideas and knowledge, based on the freest exchange 
and discussion, is essential to creative activity, the pursuit of truth and for the 
development of the personality.” Id. 
(2) In 1980, a Recommendation Concerning the Status of the Artist was 
accepted by UNESCO, in which there is a commitment of states to protect 
artists, aid them, and ensure freedom of creation, by legislating these rights in 
domestic and international law concerning human rights. See Recommendation 
Concerning the Status of the Artist, UNESCO, 21st Sess., available at 
http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/artist/html_eng/page1.shtml (Oct. 27, 
1980); see also Stephan P. Marks, Education, Science, Culture and 
Information, in 2 UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 576, 613–14 (Oscar 
Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995). 
(3) The Declaration on the Right to Development, from 1986, states in article 
1(1), inter alia, that the right to development is an inalienable human right, 
which confers on everyone the right to participate in cultural progress. See 
Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR, 
Supp. No. 53, at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986), available at http://www.-
unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/74.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2004). 
80 Recommendation on Participation by the People at Large in Cultural Life and Their 
Contribution to It, UNESCO, 19th Sess., I.2 [hereinafter Recommendation on 
Participation in Cultural Life], available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/nairobi/-
html_eng/page1.shtml (Nov. 26, 1976); see also Marks, supra note 79, at 599. 
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for freely obtaining information, training, knowledge and 
understanding, and for enjoying cultural values and cultural 
property”;81 
(2) Participation in Cultural Life: This is defined as “the 
concrete opportunities guaranteed for all—groups or 
individuals—to express themselves freely, to act, and 
engage in creative activities with a view to the full 
development of their personalities, a harmonious life and 
the cultural progress of society.”82 
This recommendation actually refers to the connection between 
protection of cultural rights and guarantees for a modern, 
democratic society.83 
UNESCO’s recommendation held that the right to participate 
in cultural life includes two central elements.  One, passively 
characterized, concerns the right to have access to culture as a right 
to be exposed to knowledge, ideas, etc.84  The second element, 
actively characterized, concerns having a role in cultural life, by 
engaging in creative activity and communicating its product to the 
public.85  As a result of recognizing the right to participate in 
cultural life as an active right, or one of creative activity, there was 
a need to recognize the right to have the freedom of creation as 
well, because freedom of creation is essential for realizing the right 
to creative activity.86  In an early draft of Article 27 of the 
Universal Declaration, the right was defined as the following: 
“Everyone has the right to participate in the cultural life of the 
community . . . .”  After discussions, it was decided to add the 
 
81 Recommendation on Participation in Cultural Life, supra note 80, I.2. 
82 Id. 
83 Marks, supra note 79, at 576, 600–01. 
84 See Recommendation on Participation in Cultural Life, supra note 80, I.2(a). 
85 See id. at I.2(b) (stating that “participation in cultural life . . . [means] the concrete 
opportunities guaranteed for all—groups or individuals—to express themselves freely, to 
act, and engage in creative activities with a view to the full development of their 
personalities, a harmonious life and the cultural progress of society”). 
86 See id. at I.1 (“This Recommendation concerns everything that should be done by 
Member States or the authorities to democratize the means and instruments of cultural 
activity, so as to enable all individuals to participate freely and fully in cultural creation 
and its benefits, in accordance with the requirements of social progress.” (emphasis 
added)). 
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word “freely” before the word “participate,” hence, without full 
freedom of creation there cannot be creative activity honoring 
human beings.87 
Furthermore, in order to clarify the content of the right to 
participate in cultural life one must clarify the term “culture.”  
UNESCO’s recommendation mentions that the term “culture” is a 
very broad one, and does not only refer to works of art or to the 
products of the social elite—such as those exhibited in museums—
but also to acquisition of knowledge, a demand for a way of life, 
and the need to communicate.88  Indeed, according to the working 
papers of the Universal Declaration, the term “culture” designated 
“high” culture.89  As later treaties are common and acceptable tools 
for interpreting prior treaties,90 however, the right to participate in 
cultural life should not be understood as limited to certain kinds of 
works.91  In any case, it is hard if not impossible to define the term 
 
87 Adalsteinsson & Thórhallson, supra note 58, at 578–79. 
88 On the preamble to UNESCO’s recommendation, the term “culture” is described or 
defined as a “social phenomenon resulting from individuals joining and co-operating in 
creative activities.” See Recommendation on Participation in Cultural Life, supra note 
80, I.2(a). 
89 This was namely culture as perceived by the social elite. See Adalsteinsson & 
Thórhallson, supra note 58, at 579. 
90 According to article 31(3) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, all 
late agreements between parties, late practice, and all relevant international rules 
applying to the parties should be taken into account while interpreting prior treaties. 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 
31(3), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2004). 
91 Nowadays, a central implication of the broad interpretation given to the term 
“culture” is the recognition of rights of developing minorities.  Over the last decade a 
lively discussion has been held on the issue of protecting folk culture and on the cultural 
rights of developing ethnic minorities as a group.  For example, see John Mugabe, 
Intellectual Property Protection and Traditional Knowledge, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 97 (1999); Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of 
Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 160 
(1998) (“[F]ailure to recognize traditional people’s creative work—in which generations 
of people add incrementally to local legends, craft traditions, and cultivated products—
has of course led a number of critics to assert that author- and inventor-centrism has the 
intended or unintended consequence of . . . permitting Western appropriators to plunder 
the work of traditional peoples. . . . [T]he creators of these collaborative works could 
benefit from property protection—not necessarily to cash in on their work, but sometimes 
simply to achieve recognition, and to prevent outsiders from appropriating and 
commercializing their emergent artistic products.”).  In this spirit, there is also a 
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“culture” accurately, and it was suggested to include in it the 
following: language, literature, religion, art, science, knowledge in 
general, and any spiritual endeavor.92  The term “culture” was thus 
given a flexible meaning, which includes art as well as science, 
according to the specific context.93 
As to the term “community” mentioned in Article 27(1), 
according to which there is right of participation in cultural life “of 
the community,” this wording replaced the words “of the society” 
that had appeared in an early draft of the article.94  The common 
view is that the words “of the community” do not limit the scope 
of the right, and some even support the view that it is 
superfluous.95 
Other issues regarding the right to participate in cultural life 
require a brief explanation.  The first issue concerns the aim of the 
right.  The justification for the right mainly stems from the aim of 
developing and realizing a human being’s personality.96  This right 
is connected to the human right to dignity, which according to the 
preamble to the Universal Declaration is the basis of the human 
 
recommendation of UNESCO: Recommendation on Safeguarding of Traditional Culture 
and Folklore, UNESCO, 25th Sess., available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws-
/paris/html_eng/page1.shtml (Nov. 16, 1989).  It should be emphasized, however, that the 
right to participate in cultural life as a human right applies to individuals only, wherever 
they are, and not to groups of people, such as minorities or ethnic groups. See Dinstein, 
supra note 59, at 75. 
92 Dinstein, supra note 59, at 74–75.  For more on the different definitions and 
meanings of “culture,” see Symonides, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 179–81. 
93 Dinstein, supra note 59, at 74.  Accordingly, it was claimed that eliminating the term 
“art” from article 15(3) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, supra note 61, does not reflect an opinion according to which the right of 
enjoying arts should not be recognized; rather it reflects the fact that the term “art” is 
superfluous since it is included in the broad term “culture.” Dinstein, supra note 59, at 
75. 
94 Adalsteinsson & Thórhallson, supra note 58, at 579. 
95 Accordingly, some scholars claim that omission of the term “community” from 
article 15(1) of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 61, is 
wise because of the conflicting views of commentators on how the term should be 
interpreted and whether it should be there at all. Adalsteinsson & Thórhallson, supra note 
58, at 579. See also Dinstein, supra note 59, at 76–77. 
96 See Adalsteinsson & Thórhallson, supra note 58, at 576 (“[T]he basic idea of cultural 
rights is that all human beings shall be entitled to take part in cultural life. . . . Otherwise, 
they would not be able to develop themselves as individuals in society, and human 
society would not flourish.”). 
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right to freedom.97  The second issue concerns the classification of 
the right.  The right includes many other basic rights, such as the 
right to self-expression, to receive information, to use a language, 
and to education.98  All these rights enable a person to participate 
in the cultural life of his or her community.99  Because the right to 
participate in cultural life could be divided into further basic rights, 
some of which are recognized as independent rights, the need for 
another independent right containing those not recognized should 
be explained.  As illustrated below, some scholars have suggested 
classifying intellectual property rights in general and copyright in 
particular as rights functioning as a means to realize primary 
universal human rights, such as freedom of expression.100  This 
kind of classification is also suitable for the right to participate in 
cultural life.101 
E. Copyright as a Human Right 
Article 27(2) of the Universal Declaration establishes the status 
of the material and the moral rights of the author as human rights.  
Despite the content of Article 27(2) there is much criticism of 
 
97 Id. at 575–76.  Support for this proposition can be found in article 22 of the 
Universal Declaration, which declares that realization of economic, social, and cultural 
rights is indispensable for a person’s dignity and free development of personality, and 
according to which the entire declaration should be interpreted. Universal Declaration, 
supra note 5. 
98 See Adalsteinsson & Thórhallson, supra note 58, at 576 (“In its broadest sense, the 
expression ‘cultural rights’ thus understood engulfs much of human rights altogether.  
Freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of association, the right to self-
determination, the right to choose one’s identity, the right to receive information, the 
right to education, and the right to use the language of one’s choice can all be considered 
cultural rights.”). 
99 Id. 
100 See infra note 117 and accompanying text. 
101 It should be mentioned that there are scholars who think that the correct 
classification of the right to participate in cultural life is a subsidiary civil and political 
right, and that placing it in the economic and social rights arena is not accurate. See 
Adalsteinsson & Thórhallson, supra note 58, at 577; Ann I. Park, Comment, Human 
Rights and Basic Needs: Using International Human Rights Norms to Inform 
Constitutional Interpretation, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1195, 1229 n.136 (1987).  For the 
distinction between the different kinds of rights, compare the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights with the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, supra note 61. 
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viewing intellectual property rights in general and copyright in 
particular as universal human rights.102 
First, there is doubt as to whether property rights in general are 
human rights.  This is because, inter alia, property rights are not 
absolute, but rather subject to public interests.103  Discussion of the 
question of whether property rights are indeed human rights is 
beyond the scope of this Essay; however, it is clear that such a 
discussion will have a crucial impact on the status of copyright as a 
human right.104  Apart from the difficulty of recognizing property 
 
102 See Dessemontet, supra note 55, at 116–20 (discussing the concern that resulted 
from the Universal Declaration’s embrace of the freedom to create, which many 
countries, including the United States, found at odds with the protection of intellectual 
property rights); see also infra notes 103–13 and accompanying text. 
103 See Lynda J. Oswald, Property Rights Legislation and the Police Power, 37 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 527, 535 (2000) (“Protection of private property rights . . . has never been 
absolute in the U.S. legal system.  The law constantly struggles to balance private 
property rights and public interests, with mixed results.” (footnote omitted)); see also 
infra note 104. 
104 In a nutshell, it is possible to classify human rights into basic liberties everyone is 
entitled to, such as the right to life and freedom, and into basic rights that everyone has 
the option to be entitled to, such as a property right, although the first kind of basic 
liberties might not be realized.  Economic, social, and cultural rights, including property 
rights, are classified as rights that everyone may have, but not everyone will actually have 
them.  Furthermore, sometimes these rights impose positive obligations on society and, as 
a result, some state action is necessary, such as resource collecting.  Thus, these rights are 
not absolute but contingent, and their realization is subject to different factors, such as 
source allocation by the state. See BECKER, supra note 15, at 76; CRAVEN, supra note 62, 
at 14; WALDRON, supra note 17, at 4–5, 20.  A basic claim against recognizing a property 
right as a human right is that it is not universal and absolute, and the list of universal 
human rights should reflect basic and absolute rights, which can not be restricted from 
time to time. Peter Drahos, The Universality of Intellectual Property Rights: Origins and 
Development, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 13, 25–27 (1999) 
[hereinafter Drahos, Origins and Development]; see also CRAVEN, supra note 62, at 6; 
Michel Vivant, Authors’ Rights, Human Rights?, 174 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT 
D’AUTEUR 60, 84 (M. Platt-Hommel trans., 1997).  Moreover, it is claimed that the fact 
that the property right was included in the Universal Declaration should not be regarded 
as proof of its classification as a human right, and a property right does not deserve wide 
and universal protection because it causes socio-economic gaps. See CRAVEN, supra note 
62, at 11; Catarina Krause & Gudmundur Alfredsson, Article 17, in THE UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMON STANDARD OF ACHIEVEMENT 359, 359–61, 
378 (Gudmundur Alfredsson & Asbjørn Eide eds., 1999).  Opposing these claims are 
scholars who classify economic rights, including property right, as “second generation” 
human rights, which arose from political ideas and legal perceptions that are not only 
rooted in natural law and have emerged in the modern era. In contrast to these rights, the 
“absolute” human rights are “first generation,” which were established from the 
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rights as human rights, various characteristics of intellectual 
property rights, such as their non-perpetuity, have been claimed to 
undermine their validity as a basic human right.105 
Second, in order to recognize copyright as a human right one 
must adopt the view that it is a natural right.  As mentioned above, 
however, there is an ongoing debate on the subject.106  It is not 
enough that natural law doctrines influenced the development of 
intellectual property rights.  The question remains as to whether 
intellectual property rights are natural rights or rights only made by 
positive law.  Despite the fact that copyright is widely recognized, 
there are profound differences in the theoretical foundations on 
which the legal copyright system is based in each country.  
Therefore, there is great difficulty from a practical point of view in 
referring to copyright as a basic human right.107  A similar 
quandary exists in relation to other economic, social, or cultural 
rights, whose recognition as human rights are questioned because 
their justifications do not stem from natural law doctrines.108 
Third, a common claim is that there is a difference between 
copyright law today, which is mostly dictated by developed 
countries in order to maintain their economic interests, and the 
rights and liberties proclaimed by international institutions.109  An 
example of such differences between copyright as human right and 
existing positive copyright involves the issue of protection of an 
author’s copyright in foreign countries.  For if copyright is a 
human right, then there is no need to codify rules according to 
which under some conditions authors could enjoy copyright 
 
eighteenth century on. See CRAVEN, supra note 62, at 8, 10.  For a critical review of this 
distinction between first and second generation human rights, see Park, supra note 101, at 
1226–31. 
105 Drahos, Origins and Development, supra note 104, at 30. 
106 See supra notes 103–05 and accompanying text 
107 Robert L. Ostergard, Intellectual Property: A Universal Human Right?, 21 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 156, 161–62 (1999); Vivant, supra note 104, at 70, 84. 
108 CRAVEN, supra note 62, at 10. 
109 Edited Transcript of Discussion on Intellectual Property and the Right to Culture 
(Nov. 9. 1998), in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 59, 63 (1999), available 
at http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/activities/1998/humanrights/papers/index.html (last visited 
Jan. 23, 2004); Rochelle Copper Dreyfuss & Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Convenors’ 
Introduction: The Culture and Economics of Participation in an Intellectual Property 
Regime, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 1–9 (1996–1997). 
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protection outside their homeland, because the right should be 
given to them wherever they are.110  Another common claim is that 
intellectual property rights do not protect the traditional knowledge 
of developing countries, causing discrimination against part of the 
world population and undermining the moral foundations of those 
rights as universal human rights.111  There are even scholars who 
hold the view that the trend among international treaties 
concerning intellectual property rights is to broaden the scope of 
the rights and their field coverage, which is not necessarily 
compatible with cultural rights aimed to increase dissemination of 
works.112  Therefore, although copyright has universal recognition, 
it is not universally perceived as a human right.113 
Following the criticism outlined above, Article 27(2) was not 
included in an early draft of the Universal Declaration.114  The 
article was added despite the view of opposing countries, including 
England and United States, that copyright and neighboring rights 
are not human rights.115  The context for the addition of cultural 
rights to the Universal Declaration of 1948 included the events of 
 
110 Silke von Lewinski, Intellectual Property, Nationality, and Non-Discrimination, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 175, 176–77, 188, 193 (1999), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/activities/1998/humanrights/papers/index.html (last visited 
Jan. 23, 2004).  In France, in one particular case, the court concluded the existence of a 
moral right in favor of a plaintiff who was not a French citizen, due to the influence of 
the Universal Declaration. See Dessemontet, supra note 55, at 114–15 n.7.  In that case, 
copyright in a Charlie Chaplin silent film was infringed by adding a soundtrack without 
permission. Id. 
111 Drahos, Origins and Development, supra note 104, at 29–30; Mugabe, supra note 
91, at 111–12. 
112 Drahos, Origins and Development, supra note 104, at 28–29. 
113 See id. at 30–31.  In order for a right be recognized as a universal human right, it is 
not enough that it is recognized all over the world; “human rights are held to exist 
independently of recognition or implementation in the customs or legal systems of 
particular countries.” JAMES W. NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 3 
(1987). 
114 For a general summary of the concerns surrounding the drafting of Article 27(2), see 
Adalsteinsson & Thórhallson, supra note 58, at 577–80; Chapman, supra note 56, at 
131–32. 
115 Adalsteinsson & Thórhallson, supra note 58, at 579; Dessemontet, supra note 55, at 
117.  For the general objection to including economic rights, which incorporates property 
rights, in the Universal Declaration, see supra note 104 and SAMNØY, supra note 66, at 
79–85. 
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War World II and the public debate afterwards on the need for a 
universal ethical code to regulate the use of the fruits of science 
and cultural properties.116  Since copyright was added to the list of 
human rights despite the problems that arose, it was suggested to 
classify copyright as a means to realize other universal human 
rights, such as the freedom of expression or the right to self-
dignity, and not as a basic human right.117 
Despite the above criticism, some scholars do view copyright 
as a human right, in that copyright contains characteristics that 
justify recognition of a universal human right, and those 
characteristics do not refer specifically to purely proprietary 
elements.118  According to this proposition, the connection between 
copyright and the personality theory, focusing on the protection of 
the external reflection of the author within the work might justify 
recognition of copyright as a human right.119  Such personal 
interests of the author, aimed to protect his or her personality, 
might also be protected via tort law in some cases.  For example, 
courts in the United States have used the traditional tort doctrines 
of libel and slander, invasion of privacy, and unfair competition in 
order to protect the personal bonds of authors to their respective 
works.120  This phenomenon demonstrates that the so-called moral 
 
116 Chapman, supra note 56, at 131–32.  For the general impact of World War II events 
on the Universal Declaration, see SAMNØY, supra note 66, at 79. 
117 Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property and Human Rights, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q., 349, 367 
(1999); see also Drahos, Origins and Development, supra note 104, at 31–32 (discussing 
the complementarities among clusters of rights: “[s]ome rights . . . are instrumental in 
securing the feasibility of claiming other types of rights.”); Vivant, supra note 104, at 78 
(quoting Christian Mouly’s views on property: “The place given to it . . . can only . . . be 
explained by analyzing it as a legal procedure for protecting the other human rights.  
Property is not the expression of one of the three fundamental rights (freedom, equality, 
dignity), it is a guarantee of the human rights which are the expression of them.”).  For 
the general view that all economic, social, and cultural rights function as means to realize 
other basic human rights, see CRAVEN, supra note 62, at 13. 
118 See, e.g., Dane S. Ciolino, Moral Rights and Real Obligations: A Property-Law 
Framework for the Protection of Authors’ Moral Rights, 69 TUL. L. REV. 935, 958 n.162 
(1995) (quoting a letter in which A.N. Yiannopoulos “suggested that the ‘analytically 
preferable framework’ for the protection of authors’ moral rights would be to treat moral 
rights as ‘absolute rights in the framework of personality’”). 
119 Id. 
120 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note  13, § 8D.02[A] (“‘[T]he doctrine of moral right 
is not part of the law in the United States . . . except insofar as parts of that doctrine exist 
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interests of authors are not purely proprietary in nature, but are 
concerned with personal injury, and that the legal means to redress 
such injury might be tort law rather than property law.121  
Therefore, the connection between copyright and the personality 
theory might be viewed as not purely proprietary in nature.122  
Moreover, further support for the view that recognition of 
copyright’s status as a human right, stemming mainly from the 
personal attachment of an author to his or her work, may be 
evidenced in early drafts of Article 27(2) that were focused only on 
the moral aspects of the author’s right.123 
Furthermore, there is great difference between the impact of 
natural law theories in general and the personality theory in 
particular on the recognition of the different intellectual property 
rights such as copyright and patents.124  Therefore, one should not 
refer to intellectual property rights as a whole, but inspect the 
underpinnings of each right separately.125  The underpinnings of 
 
in our law as specific rights—such as copyright, libel, privacy and unfair competition.’” 
(citing Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 340 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1968))). 
121 See Ciolino, supra note 118, at 959. 
122 For an explanation of the common view regarding the non-proprietary nature of the 
moral right of authors and for a position rejecting this view, see id. at 958.  In this 
context, the connection between copyright and the personality theory, briefly described 
above in notes 31–35 and accompanying text, is much more complex.  The personality 
theory, which gives another justification for property right with respect to different assets 
in general, has special application with regard to authorial works.  The need to give an 
author control over his or her work, namely over his or her intellectual endeavor, is not 
the same as the need to give a person control over tangible assets which he or she is 
attached to (such as a wedding ring).  An authorial work is a special kind of asset 
because, through the work, the author expresses his and her thoughts and desires.  Thus, 
the personality theory has a broader justification for copyright, beyond the one with 
regard to property rights in general, and in this specific context it might assimilate not 
purely proprietary argumentation.  For a discussion on the connection between authors’ 
rights and the personality theory, see DRAHOS, supra note 35, at 80–81; DAVID 
SAUNDERS, AUTHORSHIP AND COPYRIGHT 110–15, 117–18 (1992); JACOB H. SPOOR ET 
AL., COPIES IN CONTINENTAL COPYRIGHT 1, 14–15, 55 (Kluwer Academic 1980). 
123 See Vivant, supra note 104, at 92.  In this context, article 22 of the Universal 
Declaration should be mentioned.  According to article 22, everyone has a right to realize 
the economic, social, and cultural rights indispensable for their dignity and the free 
development of their personalities.  Furthermore, personality theory justifies property 
rights per se, because control over one’s assets gives one independence and security. See 
NICKEL, supra note 113, at 152; supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text. 
124 See Drahos, Origins and Development, supra note 104, at 31. 
125 See id. at 30–31. 
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copyright are twofold—natural law as well as utilitarian 
justifications126—while the underpinnings of patent rights are 
mainly utilitarian.127  Therefore, copyright might be a better 
candidate to be acknowledged as a human right than are patents.  
Among the different intellectual property rights, the patent right in 
particular is hard to accept as a human right mainly because it can 
bar access to supplies necessary for life and health.128  
Accordingly, if copyright is to be recognized as a human right 
while patent is not, then the recognition of copyrights’ status 
would not be due to its proprietary characteristics, but rather to an 
original or creative activity of a person, and the impact of such 
activity on his or her personality.129  It should be borne in mind, 
 
126 See supra Part I.A. 
127 The main justification for patents is that the right encourages inventors to develop 
new inventions, and many and varied inventions benefit society. See WILLIAM R. 
CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS AND ALLIED 
RIGHTS 129 (4th ed. 1999) (pointing out that the current debate over patent systems 
“concentrate[s] upon their role as a ‘public’ instrument of economic policy[,]” while 
“rewarding inventive ingenuity may seem little more than an incidental consequence of 
modern patent systems”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 37–39 
(Aspen Publishers 6th ed. 2003) (providing an example of how patents supply economic 
incentive for inventive activity and discussing the legal devices used within the patent 
system); Edmund W. Kitch, Property Rights in Inventions, Writings, and Marks, 13 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 121 (1990) (“Patent rights are viewed as entirely creatures 
of the statute[,]” not “as having emerged through a process of natural, customary or 
common-law development.”); Arnold Plant, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents 
for Inventions, 1 ECONOMICA 30, 32 (1934) (The aim to encourage inventing “is 
undoubtedly the expectation and hope of the vast majority of disinterested advocates of 
patents. . . . We are surely entitled, therefore, to attribute the existence of the patent law 
to a desire to stimulate invention.”), available at http://www.compilerpress.-
atfreeweb.com/Anno%20Plant%20Patent.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2004). 
128 The right of access to knowledge is of great importance, and some hold that there is 
no justification to recognize intellectual property rights as natural human rights if they 
bar use of knowledge necessary to human life.  A common example is a patent right over 
medication, which injures poorer people’s ability to obtain it.  With regard to copyright, 
however, usually the problem of access to knowledge affecting human life does not arise.  
Therefore, it is claimed that recognition of intellectual property rights as a human right 
should not be unified and each specific right should be inspected according to how much 
it causes harm to essential needs for human life. See Ostergard, supra note 107, at 161, 
169, 175–76.  For a discussion of the problems patent rights pose for the health of the 
world’s population, see Silvia Salazar, Intellectual Property and the Right to Health, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 65 (1999), available at http://www.-
wipo.int/tk/en/activities/1998/humanrights/papers/index.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2004). 
129 See Vivant, supra note 104, at 74–76, 88–90. 
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however, that if recognition of copyright’s status as a human right 
stems from the personality theory, then a question arises in cases 
where copyright is not aimed to protect an author personally, such 
as where the owner of copyright is not the actual author of the 
work.130  A possible solution for such a difficulty is to recognize 
copyright’s status as human right only in those cases in which 
copyright serves the personal interest of the author.131 
A different question, which is beyond the scope of this Essay, 
is which of the positive rights included in copyright serves the 
function of protecting the personal interests of the author.  On this 
subject, it should be noted that traditionally a distinction has been 
made between the economic rights included in copyright, such as 
the exclusive right to reproduce a work or to publicly perform it, 
and the so-called moral right.132  The moral right is a right given 
personally to the author, which remains in his or her possession 
even after the transfer of the other rights included in copyright, in 
order to enable the author to protect some reflections of his or her 
personal ties with the work.133  Most known and recognized are the 
right of attribution (the right of an author that his or her work be 
attributed to him or her) and the right of integrity (the right of an 
author that derogatory and other kind of changes shall not be made 
with respect to his or her work).134  Therefore, the center of 
copyright as a human right lies in the moral rights arena.  Reducing 
the human right perspective of copyright to the protection of the 
personal interests of the author, however, does not mean 
 
130 See id. at 94. 
131 Giving effect to human rights in a “graded” way is not so rare.  For example, the 
right to freedom of expression is given effect to a different degree according to the kind 
of speech being referred to. Id. at 100–02. 
132 See Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors’ and Artists’ Moral Rights: A 
Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 99 (1997) 
(“Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of said rights, 
the author shall have the right . . . to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other 
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be 
prejudicial to his honor or reputation.”). 
133 See id. 
134 For a description of the origin of moral rights in Continental-European jurisprudence, 
see id.; Ciolino, supra note 118, at 938–48; Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the 
Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists’ Rights in France and the United States, 78 
BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 7–11 (1981). 
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necessarily that it only applies to moral rights.  Other rights 
included in the economic bundle of copyright also may be used for 
the protection of the personal interests of the author.135  The best 
example is the exclusive right to prepare derivative works, such as 
translations, musical arrangements, and dramatizations,136 which 
might also function as a moral right because it enables authors to 
prevent unwanted changes in their works.137 
To conclude this point, Article 27 of the Universal Declaration 
acknowledges the status of copyright as a human right.  
Nevertheless, this acknowledgment has been widely criticized.  
One possible compromise is to limit the acknowledgment of 
copyright’s status as a human right only to the aspects of the right 
that deals with protection of personal interests of authors with 
respect to their works. 
F. Article 27 of the Universal Declaration, Property Right, and 
Freedom of Speech 
A question to be asked is whether recognizing copyright as 
well as the right to participate in cultural life is redundant since the 
Universal Declaration recognizes the general right of property at 
article 17 (“Article 17”)138 and the freedom of speech at article 19 
 
135 Such rights include, inter alia, the exclusive right to prepare derivative works, as 
discussed in supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text. 
136 Under U.S. copyright law: 
A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such 
as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion 
picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, 
or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.  A 
work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other 
modifications, which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 
“derivative work.” 
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).  The exclusive right of a copyright 
owner to prepare derivative works is defined in 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). 
137 For this possible function of the exclusive right to prepare derivative works, see 
Geller, supra note 1, at 193–95; Paul Goldstein, Adaptation Rights and Moral Rights in 
the United Kingdom, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, 14 INT’L 
REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 43, 45–46, 49–50, 53–54 (1983); Hansmannand & 
Santilli, supra note 132, at 112–13; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and 
the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 
12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 42–44 (1994). 
138 Universal Declaration, supra note 5. 
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(“Article 19”)139 as human rights.  As to the relation between 
Article 27(2) (recognizing copyright as a human right) and Article 
17, in discussions preceding the proclamation of the Universal 
Declaration some delegates claimed that the article concerning 
copyright was superfluous.140  Finally, it was accepted that the 
article concerning the general property right does not cover all the 
economic and moral rights of the author, hence, there was need to 
dedicate a separate article to those interests.141  In this context, 
special attention is drawn to the protection of the personal interests 
of authors with respect to their works—a goal mainly achieved by 
the moral right142—that are viewed as not purely proprietary in 
nature.143 
It also has been claimed that the rights aimed to guarantee 
participation in cultural life in Article 27(1) could be realized, at 
least in part, through the freedom of speech clause in Article 19.144  
Freedom of speech, generally speaking, protects the public’s 
interest in free access to information, as part of the democratic 
process and for the sake of revealing the truth, as well as protecting 
individual interests in self-expression as part of self-fulfillment.145  
Therefore, freedom of speech could be used to protect the interest 
of participation in cultural and creative life. A possible segregation 
between the two rights could be done, however. 
First, despite the fact that works are often used to express an 
author’s personal opinion, it was claimed that freedom of creation 
was not entirely included within freedom of speech because, for 
 
139 Id. 
140 Chapman, supra note 56, at 132. 
141 Adalsteinsson & Thórhallson, supra note 58, at 579. 
142 For the content of positive moral right, see supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
143 See supra notes 119–23 and accompanying text. 
144 Chapman, supra note 56, at 140; Christine Steiner, Intellectual Property and the 
Right to Culture, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 43, 48–49 (1999), 
available at http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/activities/1998/humanrights/papers/index.html 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2004). 
145 ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 8–23 (1985) (discussing three major theories of 
free speech: “the importance of open discussion to the discovery of truth”; free speech 
“as an integral aspect of each individual’s right to self-development and fulfillment”; and 
protection of “the right of all citizens to understand political issues so as to be able to 
participate effectively in the workings of democracy”); see also FREDERICK SCHAUER, 
FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 15–86 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1982). 
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example, some works lacked any “expression” or “message” at all.  
Namely, freedom of creation does not necessarily include “speech” 
in its simplest meaning, therefore, its inclusion in the scope of 
freedom of speech is not obvious.146 As aforesaid, there are various 
 
146 Although “political” speech stands at the heart of freedom of speech, there are 
additional kinds of expression that will be protected, on different levels, including 
“artistic expression.”  Artistic expression is often included in freedom of speech.  In the 
United States, after Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), speech could no longer 
be suppressed unless aimed at and likely to incite lawless conduct.  Art “unlikely to 
trigger city-wide riots, seems on the whole protected.”  For the European rule, see 31 
YEARBOOK OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 143, 144 (Council of 
Europe ed., 1988) (summarizing the judgment in the case of Müller v. Switzerland, 13 
E.H.R.R 212 (1988), in which the court stated that “Article 10 of the Convention 
included the freedom of artistic expression, ‘which affords the opportunity to take part in 
the public exchange of cultural, political and social information and ideas of all kinds’” 
(citation omitted)).  For the rule in England, see Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 12(4) 
(Eng.) (“The court must have particular regard to the importance of the Convention right 
to freedom of expression . . . where the proceedings relate to . . . journalistic, literary or 
artistic material . . . .”), available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80042—
b.htm (Nov. 13, 1988).  For the rule in Canada, see CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 
1982), pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 2(b), (“[F]reedom of thought, 
belief, opinion and expression” is included among the fundamental freedoms.), available 
at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/charter (last visited Jan. 24, 2004); Aubry v. Éditions Vice-
Versa Inc., [1998] S.C.R. 591, 615–16 (The Supreme Court of Canada stated that “[i]t is 
our view that freedom of expression includes freedom of artistic expression.”).  For the 
rule in Germany, see article 5 of the Basic Law art. 5 Nr. (3) GG (“Art and scholarship, 
research, and teaching shall be free.”), available at http://www.iuscomp.org/-
gla/statutes/GG.htm#5 (last visited Jan. 23, 2004); BARENDT, supra note 145, at 35.  Even 
if artistic expression is included in freedom of speech, however, it is claimed that certain 
works do not include any expression, verbal or nonverbal, as referred to in the context of 
the freedom of speech right, because the work does not communicate any specific idea, 
message, or information.  In those cases, therefore, freedom of creation will not fully be 
protected through freedom of speech.  Actually, the claim is that there must be a 
separation between applying freedom of speech with artistic speech, and applying 
freedom of speech with freedom of creation in its broadest meaning.  Freedom of artistic 
speech involves some sort of “speech,” hence it could be interpreted as included in the 
scope of freedom of speech.  In contrast, freedom of creation does not necessarily include 
“speech” in its simplest meaning, therefore, its inclusion in the scope of freedom of 
speech is not obvious. See PAUL KEARNS, THE LEGAL CONCEPT OF ART, 174–75 (1998) 
(“[N]ot all art can be protected as ‘symbolic speech’ if that term implied a cognitive or 
propositional content.  Abstract art, for instance, seldom communicates a knowledge-
based idea . . . .”); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and 
Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 210 (1998) (“Certain types 
of expressive works may not qualify as speech at all.”).  The question of whether freedom 
of speech includes freedom of creation deals with setting limits to the freedom of speech 
right and not with the principal question of whether those liberties should be maintained.  
In other words, the question discussed above is what is included in the term “speech,” 
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justifications for freedom of speech,147 each one of them leading to 
a different interpretation as to the scope of the term “speech.”148  
Nevertheless, it is clear that there is an overlap between freedom of 
speech as part of self-fulfillment and freedom of creation.149  Even 
though freedom of creation may be encompassed in the broad 
freedom of speech, however, freedom of creation should be treated 
distinctively in order to allow incorporation of the relevant 
considerations for its full fulfillment.150  In other words, 
 
and whether said kind of works, with no specific ideas, are to be regarded as “speech.” 
See BARENDT, supra note 145, at 37–67. 
147 See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
148 BARENDT, supra note 145, at 8–23, 37–41; Dessemontet, supra note 55, at 117 (“[A] 
wide understanding of the freedom of speech shall encompass the freedom to create as a 
wide understanding of copyright shall attach not only to published productions, but also 
to unpublished ones.”); SCHAUER, supra note 145, at 91 (“The concept of free speech is 
far too complex for that, and at too many points the definition depends upon the 
resolution of undetermined behavioural, ethical and empirical issues from which any 
justification for freedom of speech must be resolved.”). 
149 For a presentation of this view and criticism of it, see Fiona Macmillan Patfield, 
Towards a Reconciliation of Free Speech and Copyright, 2 Y.B. MEDIA & ENT. L. 199, 
206 (1996); see also BARENDT, supra note 148, at 14–20. 
150 Freedom of creation discourse might be focused on different considerations than 
those emerging out form a typical freedom of speech debate.  An example is to be found 
in the European case of Müller v. Switzerland, 13 E.H.R.R 212 (1988), which was 
concerned with an obscene painting removed by the authorities form a public exhibition, 
according to a law against publication of obscenity.  Up to this point, it seems to be a 
typical freedom of speech controversy, of posing limitation on artistic expression 
involving obscenity.  The European court held that freedom of speech is not absolute, and 
rules against publication of obscene materials prevail. Id. at 226–29.  For similar position 
in the United States and for more about art, obscenity, and free speech, see BARENDT, 
supra note 145, at 269–72; OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 27–49 (Harvard 
Univ. Press 1996); SCHAUER, supra note 145.  Another question was raised in the Müller 
v. Switzerland case, however, and that is whether confiscating the painting was legal.  
Court affirmed such confiscation, and held that it was compatible with limitations over 
free speech. Id. at 229–32.  It is to be asked whether the court’s decision would have been 
the same in a case emphasizing freedom of creation instead of freedom of speech.  A 
possible entitlement of an artist to keep a copy of his work in privacy could be derived 
form the freedom of creation discourse and its specific considerations, while examining 
such entitlement through the typical freedom of speech prism does not necessarily reveal 
its full complexity. 
Accordingly, another proposition with respect to a possible segregation between the two 
rights is that freedom of creation “is not freedom of opinion; although a creation may 
convey an opinion, that fact alone does not justify the freedom of creation. . . . [I]t 
appears that the freedom of creation is a condition precedent to the unfettered exercise of 
the freedom of speech and of opinion.” Dessemontet, supra note 55, at 117. Therefore, it 
might be that freedom to create is recognized even if eventually speech is restricted due 
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proclaiming the right to access and participation in cultural life is 
not superfluous due to the recognition of the general freedom of 
speech; rather, it could be classified as a narrower, more specific 
form of freedom of expression, concerning particular interests in 
the field of art and culture. 
Second, it also may be claimed that the right to participate in 
cultural life, being a kind of a socio-economic human right and not 
a civil-political human right,151 is focused on the social and 
economic terms of people to obtain participation in cultural life.152 
Therefore, for example, while in accordance to the traditional 
 
to the prevailing ethic. See id.  And, referring to the above example of the Müller v. 
Switzerland case, the artist has a right to create even if such art is doomed to be silenced.  
In other words, even if obscenity is “speech,” it might as well be restricted; however, it is 
still to be asked whether there is a right to create obscenity art, and consequentially 
posses such art in private.  Dessemontet describes another situation, other than obscenity, 
in which speech might be restricted due to prevailing public interest, although creation in 
itself is allowed—that is, in a case of an exhibition of photos showing various bridges and 
other locations where suicide could be easy.  Although no one would object to taking 
pictures at the various spots, still speech as a concrete message of the exhibition might be 
restricted. See id.  Getting deeper into the possible philosophical differentiation between 
freedom of creation and freedom of speech according the self-fulfillment justification 
leads to the touchstone of “communication.”  Freedom of speech is highly connected to 
the interest of both speaker and audience in communication of speech, see BARENDT, 
supra note 145, at 18–19; SCHAUER, supra note 145, at 91, 95.  Freedom to create, 
however, might be relevant also without any external communication of the creation at 
stake, and thus it is more connected to freedom of conscience and thought, and 
restrictions on such freedoms can be viewed as purely paternalistic. See SCHAUER, supra 
note 145, at 94.  In this context, see also Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: 
Copyright Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 2, 4, 34 (2002) (discussing “freedom of 
imagination” as a right which is preliminary to the traditional freedom of artistic speech). 
151 See Dessemontet, supra note 55, at 117 (“The freedom of creation is not first and 
foremost a political right, as is on the whole—but not only—the freedom of speech.”); 
supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
152 See Recommendation on Participation in Cultural Life, supra note 80, at I.2(a) 
(“[A]ccess to culture . . . [means] the concrete opportunities available to everyone, in 
particular through the creation of the appropriate socio-economic conditions, for freely 
obtaining information, training, knowledge and understanding, and for enjoying cultural 
values and cultural property.”) (emphasis added); see also Symonides, HUMAN RIGHTS, 
supra note 78, at 191 (“[G]overnments should help to create and sustain not only climate 
encouraging freedom of artistic expression but also the material conditions facilitating the 
release of creative talents.”); Recommendation on Participation in Cultural Life, supra 
note 80, at I.2(b) (stating that “participation in cultural life . . . [means] the concrete 
opportunities guaranteed for all—groups or individuals—to express themselves freely, to 
act, and engage in creative activities with a view to the full development of their 
personalities, a harmonious life and the cultural progress of society”) (emphasis added). 
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reasoning of the Supreme Court copyright does not conflict with 
freedom of speech,153 still it is open to be decided whether 
copyright conflicts with the right to participate in cultural life 
because “ the concrete opportunities available to everyone, in 
particular through the creation of the appropriate socio-economic 
conditions for freely obtaining information”154 are not guaranteed. 
To conclude, although the interests protected by Article 27 of 
the Universal Declaration might be included in the scope of the 
general property right and the right to freedom of speech, Article 
27 is not redundant.  It is necessary because it focuses on the 
unique aspects of cultural subjects, creation, and science, and their 
special problems, such as the moral right protecting the personal 
interests of authors in their works, freedom to create works of art 
that do not include “speech” specifically, and the socio-economic 
aspects of obtaining cultural products. 
II.  THE PROPOSAL: THE INTRODUCTION OF NATURAL LAW 
CONSIDERATIONS INTO AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 
As explained above, the status of the Universal Declaration is 
controversial.155  It is accepted, however, that it is at least a central 
source of inspiration and therefore has potential for great influence 
in the domestic field.156  Such influence might occur, for example, 
through the interpretation of domestic laws.157  As a result, the 
 
153 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212–13 (2003); Harper & Row Publishers, 
Inc., v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).  For the opinion that such reasoning is a 
denial of an existing conflict, see Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First 
Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 
(1999); Michael Birnhack, The Copyright Law And Free Speech Affair: Making-Up And 
Breaking-Up, 43 IDEA 233 (2003); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of 
Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 189 (1998); 
Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057 (2001); Neil 
Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. 
REV. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Netanel, Locating Copyright]. 
154 See Recommendation on Participation in Cultural Life, supra note 80, at I.2(a). 
155 See supra Part I.B. 
156 See supra notes 73, 76 and accompanying text. 
157 See Re, supra note 73 (discussing the role of domestic courts in following the spirit 
of the Universal Declaration, inter alia, through interpretation of domestic statutes and 
constitutional provisions); see also supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
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Universal Declaration has the potential to enable the insertion of its 
rights into domestic laws, accompanied by the natural law 
perceptions on which it is founded.158  Therefore, Article 27 of the 
Universal Declaration can be used to introduce its agenda into 
domestic copyright law, namely to embed natural law 
considerations in the existing theoretical infrastructure of 
American copyright law. 
Article 27 is not made of one cloth, however.  Therefore, 
attention should be given to the meaning of inserting into the 
domestic field rights that may conflict with each other.  Section C 
discusses this concern.  As will be explained, the fact that Article 
27 contains two opposing balancing rights should be considered in 
the introduction of natural law considerations into domestic 
copyright law in a balanced way.  The natural rights included in 
Article 27 can be used to support both authors and users of works, 
and they serve the interests of both private individuals and the 
public at large.159  Thus, the natural rights perceptions reflected in 
the Universal Declaration can be integrated into the current 
American copyright system without changing the existing balance 
of interests, or even enhance the interests of users of works. 
The proposed mechanism for using Article 27 to insert natural 
law considerations into American copyright law might be seen as 
problematic in another dimension.  As mentioned, Congress has 
the constitutional power to legislate copyright law in order “to 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”160  This could be 
taken to mean that the Constitution dictates the use of exclusively 
utilitarian considerations in legislating copyright law.  As Section 
D will demonstrate, however, there is a way to interpret the 
Constitution so as not to exclude natural law perceptions in the 
field of copyright.161 
Two questions still need to be answered before continuing.  
The first relates to why an enabling mechanism to insert natural 
law perceptions into American copyright law is needed.  The 
 
158 See id. 
159 See discussion supra Part I.D–E and notes 77–137. 
160 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
161 See discussion infra Part II.D.1 and notes 220–52. 
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second concerns exactly how Article 27 can be used as a source of 
influence in copyright law. 
A. The Question of Why 
The first question we must ask is why we need an enabling 
mechanism to insert natural law perceptions into American 
copyright law.  The relevance of this question is even greater if one 
accepts the proposition that the natural rights that Article 27 would 
insert into domestic law would not change the existing balance of 
interests,162 thus rendering Article 27 superfluous.  There are 
several answers to this question.  First, as explained above, there is 
an ongoing debate over the justifications for copyright.163  
Adherents of the view that copyright may be justified by a 
combination of different theories164 might seek a path to introduce 
the natural law perceptions into positive law. 
Second, it is a known phenomenon that, even though American 
copyright law is deemed to be utilitarian oriented,165 it contains 
other elements as well.166  In existing copyright law and 
jurisprudence there is a notable presence of natural law perceptions 
and considerations, whether explicit or implicit.167  Some of the 
reasoning emanating from the U.S. Supreme Court is based on 
natural law considerations.168  Moreover, some of the rules 
 
162 That is because the natural rights included in Article 27 can be used to support both 
authors and users of works, and they serve the interests of both private individuals and 
the public at large. 
163 See discussion supra Part I.A and notes 14–43 (discussing utilitarian, moral, and 
natural right justifications). 
164 See supra note 37 (acknowledging that scholars recognize the dualistic natural and 
utilitarian theoretical basis for Anglo-American copyright law). 
165 See supra notes 1–4, 13 and accompanying text (discussing the utilitarian 
justifications of American copyright law). 
166 See supra note 37 (as acknowledged by proponents of the dualistic view). 
167 See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 37, at 1873–88 (addressing the history of labor and 
authorship in copyright law); Gordon, Property Right in Self-Expression, supra note 9, at 
1592–04 (giving examples of natural law and Lockean labor theory in copyright cases); 
Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality, supra note 37, at 1198–1204 (addressing the dual rhetoric in 
the Supreme Court’s reasoning); Yen, supra note 9, at 529–31. 
168 An interesting recent example is the New York Times Co. v. Tasini holding in which 
the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) of the copyright law as fortifying 
authors’ rights. 533 U.S. 483, 487–506 (2001).  According to § 201(c), “[c]opyright in 
each separate contribution to a collective work is distinct from copyright in the collective 
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codified by U.S. law reflect strong ties to natural law notions, a 
good example of which is the moral right, codified in 17 U.S.C.  
§ 106A.169  The United States has acknowledged moral rights, to 
some extent, due to its international obligations after joining the 
Berne Convention for Literary and Artistic Works.170  Moral rights 
 
work as a whole,” and unless agreed otherwise, “the owner of copyright in the collective 
work is presumed to have acquired only the privilege of reproducing and distributing the 
[separate] contribution of an author as part of the particular collective work . . . .” 17 
U.S.C. § 201(c) (2000).  The question in the Tasini case was whether the privilege of 
reproducing and distributing the separate contribution of an author as part of the 
particular collective work should enable a newspaper publisher to include the separate 
articles written by freelance journalists in an electronic database containing other articles 
published by the newspaper. See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 487.  The Court held that the 
interpretation of the privilege given to the owner of the newspaper as a collective work is 
done through the prism of the fact that where a freelance author has contributed an article 
to a newspaper, copyright in this article vests initially in the freelance author. See id. at 
496–97 (“[A]fter authorizing initial publication, the freelancer may also sell the article to 
others.”).  Therefore, in order to preserve the right of the freelance author, the privilege of 
the publisher must be constructed narrowly, as not encompassing a right to include the 
article in an electronic database. See id. at 499.  The Court was interested in protecting 
the author’s exclusive right from invasion. See id.  This result might be explained by 
utilitarian tools. See id. at 495 n.3 (referring to the famous quotation from Mazer v. Stein, 
347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954), according to which “encouragement of individual effort 
[motivated] by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare”).  The decision’s 
“aroma,” however, is naturalistic.  Copyright is now more identified with the author than 
with the publisher. See id. (observing that the 1976 revision of the Copyright Act 
represented a break from the former tradition of identifying copyright more closely with 
publishers than with authors).  Accordingly, the Court is concerned with preserving the 
authors’ interests to have control over the exploitation of their work.  In natural law 
language, it could even be said that the Court is concerned about the (natural) 
expectations of authors to have such control.  For more examples, see Ginsburg, supra 
note 37, at 1873–88; Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality, supra note 37; Yen supra note 9 at 
529–31. 
169 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000).  Moral rights include the right of 
attribution and the right of integrity. Id.; see also supra notes 134–37 and accompanying 
text (suggesting that moral rights also include the right to prepare derivative works). 
170 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 
1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]; Visual Artists 
Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit.VI, 104 Stat. 5089, 5128–5133 (1990); see 
also 136 CONG. REC. H3111, H3113 (1990) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) (stating that 
the Visual Rights Act grants “important new rights [to visual artists] based on those set 
forth in the Berne [C]onvention”).  Representative Kastenmeier noted that although 
Congress, before joining the Berne Convention in March 1989, “decided that United 
States law was already sufficient to comply” with the Convention’s requirement that “its 
members . . . provide artists with a certain level of protection,” this did “not necessarily 
mean that [U.S. laws were] sufficient for all purposes.” Id.  The obligation to recognize 
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reflect natural law conceptions, and despite this they have found 
their way into American copyright legislation.171  How could 
Congress add these naturalistic rights to the copyright arena 
despite the utilitarian command of the Copyright Clause?  The 
formal answer is that a utilitarian purpose underlies moral rights as 
well.172  Accordingly, Congress was convinced that the narrow 
 
the attribution right and the integrity right under the Berne Convention is stipulated in 
article 6bis thereof. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8D.06[C][1] (affirming that 
the statutory language regarding visual artists’ right to prevent distortion, mutilation, or 
modification of their work was drawn from the Berne Convention). 
171 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106A. 
172 Many scholars have pointed out the aggregate economic rationale underlying moral 
rights. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. 
L. REV. 1, 27–96 (1997) (discussing a pragmatic and economic approach); Hansmannand, 
supra note 134, at 102, 104–05.  Melville B. Nimmer, in a 1967 article, while discussing 
the needed revisions in American copyright law in order to accomplish the Berne 
Convention standard, noted that Congress has the constitutional power to legislate moral 
rights.  Contrary to other topics, such as protection of unfixed works, acknowledgment of 
moral rights does not contain a constitutional problem. See Melville B. Nimmer, 
Implications of the Prospective Revisions of the Berne Convention and the United States 
Copyright Law, 19 STAN. L. REV. 499, 519 (1967).  Accordingly, Congress was presented 
with the view that the moral rights added by the Visual Artists’ Rights Act of 1990 would 
advance public aims, such as preservation of works, or general utilitarian aims, such as 
protection of artists’ reputations. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8D.06 nn.58, 
67 & 108. 
Statements drawn from congressional records demonstrate this insight.  For example, 
Representative Robert Kastenmeier presenting the Visual Artists Rights Act for vote in 
the House of Representatives on June 5, 1990, explained two of the goals of the act as 
follows: “First, the act must protect the honor and reputations of visual artists. . . . The 
second goal was to protect the works of art themselves.  Society is the ultimate loser 
when these works are modified or destroyed.” 136 CONG. REC. H3111, H3113 (1990) 
(statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).  Representative Pat Williams summarized the purpose 
of the Visual Artists Rights Act before the House of Representatives on June 13, 1990 in 
the following way: 
The Visual Artists Rights Act affords two main benefits.  First, it would help 
prevent the destruction or mutilation of important works of art—art that is an 
invaluable part of American culture.  Second, the legislation would give an 
artist legal recourse to prevent an individual from attributing his or her work to 
another and to prevent an individual from claiming that an artist was the creator 
of a work he or she did not create. 
136 CONG. REC. E1939 (1990) (extension of remarks of Rep. Williams). 
Another example of the utilitarian justification for moral rights from the Congressional 
Record is given by Melville B. Nimmer and David Nimmer in explaining the purpose of 
the attribution right, quoting from the House Report: “The purpose of these rights is both 
to provide basic fairness to artists and to ‘promote the public interest by increasing 
available information concerning artworks and their provenance, and by helping ensure 
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moral right to be legislated had a utilitarian justification and did 
not interfere with the realization of economic rights.173  Even if 
the formal answer as to the authority to legislate moral rights were 
focused on the possible incremental underlying utilitarian 
justification for moral rights and its non-interference with 
economic rights, the major source of these rights is grounded in 
natural law perceptions.174  Incidentally, moral rights were 
legislated only after the United States was driven to do so by 
international obligation, and this very obligation is rooted in 
natural law perceptions.175  It could be argued, therefore, that 
natural law has already colonized American copyright law.  The 
alternative view, according to which moral rights are 
acknowledged in copyright law as long as there are utilitarian 
justifications, ignores reality and the background of legislation.  In 
any case, the answer as to Congress’ power to legislate moral 
rights also can be found in the mandate to accomplish international 
obligations, which functions as an additional constitutional source 
of power, along with the power stipulated by the Copyright 
Clause.176 
 
that information is accurate.’” See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8D.06[B][1] 
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 14 (1990)).  Hence, it seems that the legislation of 
moral rights via the Visual Artists Rights Act is consistent with the utilitarian 
constitutional command. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 1.03[A], at n.1.1. 
173 It was stated in the Congressional Record that the narrow moral right recognized in 
legislation was “designed to preserve and protect certain limited categories of works of 
visual art” and “to achieve this goal without interfering, directly or indirectly, with the 
ability of U.S. copyright owners and users to further the constitutional goal of ensuring 
public access to a broad, diverse array of creative works.” 136 CONG. REC. H3111, 
H3114 (1990) (statement of Rep. Moorhead). 
174 For the natural law conception underlying article 6bis of the Berne Convention, 
which acknowledges moral rights, see SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886–1986, 455–59 (1987). See also 
Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality, supra note 37, at 1244 (“Beyond Hegel, it remains difficult 
to understand why the identity of artists and authors should be more bound up with their 
work than the identity of others who enjoy no protection against alteration of their 
work.”). 
175 For the natural law conception underlying the right recognized by the Visual Artists 
Rights Act, adding a sort of “moral right” to the American copyright law, see NIMMER & 
NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8D.06[A][2]. See also 101 CONG. REC. H3111, supra note 170. 
176 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (governing the regulation of commerce with foreign 
nations).  In this context, see infra note 272 and accompanying text.  For the legislation 
of moral right as a fulfillment of international obligations under the Berne Convention, 
see NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8D.02[B]–[D]. 
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Aside from moral rights, there are other examples of natural 
law “footprints” in existing positive copyright law, such as the fair 
use doctrine,177 according to which an unauthorized use of 
copyrighted work might be allowed.178  The Copyright Act 
includes an exemplary list of considerations with which to inspect 
the fairness of the use of a work; however, it is left to the court’s 
discretion to weigh the balance of the fair use factors based on the 
specific facts of the case.179  There are leading theories that suggest 
a market-failure test to determine when a fair use defense ought to 
be accepted by the courts.180  Other theories advance the utilitarian 
attitude of the doctrine with other tests.181  Fairness, after all, is 
clearly not a purely utilitarian term.182 
The advantage that stems from the proposed mechanism 
enabling the formal insertion of natural law perceptions is that it 
will contribute to the transparency of the American copyright 
 
177 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1996). 
178 “[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, 
news reporting, teaching, . . . scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of 
copyright.” Id. 
179 The statutory fairness considerations are: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use . . .; (2) the nature of the copyrighted 
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for . . . the copyrighted work. 
Id.  For a thorough description of the fair use doctrine, and the different considerations in 
examining the fairness of use of a copyrighted work, see WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR 
USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW (1995). 
180 See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 253 
(1983). 
181 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (accepting 
District Court Judge Leval’s approach that a “transformative” use is a better candidate for 
the fair use defense); see also Pierre N. Leval, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use Rescued, 44 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1449 (1997) (finding the Campbell case has restored order and 
rediscovered the central meaning of fair use); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use 
Standard, 103 HARV.  L. REV. 1105 (1990) (positing that the governing principles of fair 
use are “rooted in the objectives of the copyright law”). 
182 For the non-utilitarian origins of the fair use doctrine, see Gideon Parchomovsky, 
Fair Use, Efficiency, and Corrective Justice, 3 LEGAL THEORY 347, 350–54, 366–70 
(1997). See also Damstedt, supra note 37, at 1213 (“The fair use doctrine in U.S. 
copyright law is similar in function and economic justification to the Lockean fair use 
right developed in this Note. . . . The functional application of the fair use doctrine in 
copyright law mirrors Lockean principles.”). 
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system and will shed light on some of the basic and unavoidable 
“impulses” of copyright law.183  In this way, some of the 
considerations that are taken into account in any case will be 
legitimized, and there will be no need to disguise them rhetorically 
by artificial utilitarian justifications.  Consequently, if legitimized, 
such argumentation also could be properly inspected and 
scrutinized.  Section C will return to this question of why, and 
suggest further possible answers. 
B. The Question of How 
The second question to be asked is how exactly Article 27 can 
be exercised as a source of influence in domestic copyright law.  
Generally, international rights can be integrated into domestic law 
in several ways, such as enforcement of international agreements 
that are part of American law, or by recognizing the right at stake 
as part of customary international law and, hence, part of American 
law.184  As noted above, however, there is room for the view that 
the Universal Declaration has a non-binding status, and the status 
of each of the rights proclaimed in it must be inspected separately.  
Moreover, it is debated whether a state’s international obligations 
create legal obligations as to its own nationals.185  This Essay is 
interested in finding a mechanism that will enable courts to 
internalize Article 27 philosophies into the domestic scheme.  If 
one accepts the presumption that Article 27 is of an inspirational 
nature,186 then a better answer to the question of how will be that 
the perceptions found in Article 27 might be inserted into 
copyright law mainly through interpretive use.  That is to say, 
these perceptions could be used in interpreting domestic law.  
 
183 For a remarkable discussion of such “impulses,” see Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning 
Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149 
(1992). 
184 See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 72, § 701 (describing how 
human rights have come to be a part of international and U.S. law). 
185 According to the traditional view, the individual is only a “third party beneficiary” of 
the state’s obligation to another state. See Louis Henkin, International Human Rights 
Standards in National Law: The Jurisprudence of the United States [hereinafter Henkin, 
Human Rights Standards], in 49 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN HUMAN RIGHTS: ENFORCING 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC COURTS 189 (Benedetto Conforti & 
Francesco Francioni eds., 1997). 
186 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
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Although doctrines of law interpretation is beyond the scope of this 
Essay, according to a basic interpretive principle, there are general 
values of the legal system that influence the interpretation of 
existing laws, including the Constitution’s provisions.187  These 
general values might be, for example, basic and universal rights 
and liberties recognized by all people.  In other words, human 
rights norms can aid the interpretation of domestic norms.188  
Scholarly writings adhere to the thesis that human rights norms 
should be used to infuse U.S. constitutional and statutory 
standards.189  It even was proposed that relevant human rights 
norms should be used in interpreting and applying constitutional 
provisions involving similar rights, because human rights are a 
positive external source of law and the Constitution should be 
interpreted according to a broader context rather than the purely 
domestic one.190  This thesis is directly connected to the argument 
concerning the nature of human rights in general, according to 
which human rights may be used to express the expectations of the 
community at large, even between a state and its own nationals.191  
Namely, international human rights law is “national” law, because 
 
187 See e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 8. 
188 For this interpretive principle, see Robert S. Summers, Statutory Interpretation in the 
United States, in INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 407, 417–18, 453 (D. 
Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991).  Generally speaking, the American 
legal culture is open to value and policy judgments. See id. at 456–57; see also 
Committee Report: Judicial Education on International Law Committee of the Section  
International Law of the American Bar Association, 24 INT’L LAW. 903, 907–09, 914 
(1990) (submitted by Edward D. Re, Chairman). 
189 See, e.g., Henkin, Human Rights Standards, supra note 185, at 189, 198; Lillich, 
supra note 72, at 408–11.  For the important role courts have in implementing the rights 
and liberties proclaimed in the Universal Declaration, see Re, supra note 73 at 680–81, 
686.  For the potential role of courts in implementing the international instruments 
regarding human rights, especially via posing remedies, see STEINER & ALSTON, supra 
note 51, at 248, 275.  For an example of the possible use of the interpretive tool in order 
to implement social welfare rights, as human rights, into American law, see Park, supra 
note 101, at 1243–46. 
190 This was Professor Christenson’s proposition. See Gordon A. Christenson, Using 
Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and Equal Protection Analyses, 52 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 3, 4–5, 12–13 (1983). 
191 See id. at 5–6 (discussing D’Amato’s thesis with regard to the impact of human 
rights in the domestic field); see also Anthony D’Amato, The Concept of Human Rights 
in International Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1110, 1125–27 (1982) (discussing the place of 
human rights in international law and proposing to view human rights as entitlements 
affecting the domestic law referring to a nation’s citizens and not only to aliens). 
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it is concerned with “rights which every human being enjoys, or 
should enjoy, in his or her own society and under its national 
law.”192  Human rights, therefore, might create an external source 
of law that applies domestically, which is beyond the traditional 
international law that is concerned only with interrelations between 
states.  Even if the proposition viewing human rights as a positive 
external source of law is too ambitious, it is acceptable to view 
international human rights norms as sources of inspiration, whose 
influence is felt via the indirect route of interpreting domestic laws. 
Going back to the issue at stake, this means that the natural law 
perceptions reflected in Article 27 of the Universal Declaration, 
being a source of inspiration, can be absorbed in American 
copyright law by giving them proper weight when interpreting 
copyright law, including the Copyright Clause in a specific case.  
The following section illustrates the possible ways Article 27 can 
be brought to bear domestic copyright law.  Section D will address 
why this proposed mechanism is not barred by the Copyright 
Clause itself. 
C. The Potential of a Balanced Use of Article 27 
Article 27 of the Universal Declaration sets forth two human 
rights: (1) the right to participate in cultural life and, as a result, the 
freedom of creation, and (2) the author’s economic and moral right 
with respect to his or her work.193  Copyright, which represents the 
author’s economic and moral right, at times may conflict with the 
right to participate in cultural life.  The basic conflict lies in that 
the owner of copyright is given the power to control the 
exploitation of his or her work and, to some extent, even the power 
 
192 Henkin, Human Rights Standards, supra note 185, at 189; see also supra note 66 and 
accompanying text (discussing the proposition that the Universal Declaration is not 
aimed to bind states but rather society as a whole).  In this context another profound 
thesis should be noted, and according to which “the European Convention on Human 
Rights [though an international instrument] ought to be interpreted so that it is applicable 
where [people] face abuses from private actors.” ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
THE PRIVATE SPHERE 343 (1993). 
193 See Universal Declaration, supra note 5.  It should be mentioned that, according to 
the classic view, human rights are given to individuals and not to the public.  See 
Mugabe, supra note 91, at 111–14 (discussing intersection of Universal Declaration with 
traditional knowledge of indigenous people). 
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to prevent the public free access to it.194  There are many situations 
illustrating this possible conflict.  A conflict may arise, for 
example, when a person is interested in using a preexisting work as 
the basis for a new work, but is prevented from doing so due to 
rights of the preexisting work’s owner.195  As mentioned above, 
different countries, including the United States and the United 
Kingdom, objected to the inclusion of Article 27(2) because of 
conflicts with Article 27(1).196  Article 27, however, reflects the 
tension existing at the basis of copyright law.  It is the tension 
between granting the author material and moral control over his or 
her work and enabling the public at large to obtain free access to 
works and information, including the possibility to use such 
materials that are necessary for cultural development.  And this 
tension exists according to both natural law and utilitarian 
standpoint for justifying copyright.197  Thus, the recognition of the 
 
194 See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1996) (defining the exclusive powers 
authorized by copyright). See also the additional powers given to copyright owners by the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1998). 
195 One of the powers conferred by copyright is the right to control production of 
derivative works, which are works based upon preexisting works. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 
106(2).  Another possible example of conflict between copyright (or the author’s right) 
and the right to participate in cultural life is when an author wishes to modify his or her 
work, but the public desires to prevent such modification in order to preserve a work of 
great public importance.  These potential conflicts presume that the right to participate in 
cultural life could be interpreted as a right protecting public interest in artistic discourse, 
rather than a right protecting the individual’s interest.  Furthermore, the clash between the 
two rights might include a situation in which society wishes to protect a work from its 
own creator.  For this proposition, see Christoph B. Graber & Gunther Tubner, Art and 
Money: Constitutional Rights in the Private Sphere?, 18 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 61, 67–
68 (1998). 
196 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
197 Many scholars have demonstrated the basic contradiction in the justifications for 
copyright, inspected from the natural law and utilitarian points of view. See Sterk, 
Rhetoric and Reality, supra note 37, at 1209, 1239  (“It is critical, however, that no 
efficiency justification—other than administrative simplicity—can support a copyright 
regime that gives authors protection that would not induce the creation of new works.  
Indeed, from an efficiency standpoint, the optimal copyright system would not seek to 
maximize the number of works created but, in recognition of the costs of copyright, 
would withdraw protection even when marginally more protection would result in 
marginal increase in creative activity . . . . For those who believe in the distribution of 
social wealth according to moral principle, copyright is problematic because the talents 
people are born with appear morally arbitrary.  For those who believe the state should not 
intervene to redistribute the proceeds of natural talents, copyright is problematic because 
authors cannot rely exclusively on voluntary transfers to derive a return on their talents.”) 
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two conflicting rights included in Article 27 is neither surprising 
nor impossible. 
If both copyright and the right to participate in cultural life are 
acknowledged as human rights, then there will be a need to 
develop a mechanism for striking a balance between them in the 
event of contradiction.  Consequently, the question becomes: what 
is the relation between Articles 27(1) and 27(2)?  More 
specifically: which of these two rights is the general prevailing 
principle, and which is regarded as the restrictive inferior right? 
Among the adherents of natural law justifications for 
copyright, there is a tendency to shape copyright as a primary right 
and to impose a general obligation not to harm it, subject to 
exemptions that are essential for the protection of the interest of 
participation in cultural life.198  An alternative view is that the right 
 
(citation omitted); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 47 (5th ed. 1998) 
(“The greater the scope of copyright protection of the earlier works, the higher the cost of 
creating subsequent works.  So while an increase in the scope of copyright protection will 
enhance an author’s expected revenues from the sale or licensing of his own copyrights, 
it will also increase his cost of creating the works that he copyrights.”); see also Glynn S. 
Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 
483, 486 (1996) (stating that “[a]s a general proposition, a work’s desirability will 
indicate both the need to ensure the work’s creation and the need to secure its widespread 
distribution.  The more desirable a work is, the greater the need to ensure the creation of 
the work and the greater the need to secure its widespread dissemination.  If the need to 
ensure a work’s creation suggests a broad copyright, while the need to secure its 
widespread dissemination suggests a narrow copyright, then incentive and access will 
always oppose each other with exactly equal force.); Gordon, Property Right in Self-
Expression, supra note 9. 
198 See Waldron, supra note 50, at 859 (describing two different interpretations that may 
be applied in shaping copyright).  The German law is a good example of the view that 
property right including copyright is the main rule, but they should be limited in order to 
protect public interest.  According to article 14 of the German Basic Law, property rights 
have constitutional status; however, property rights also pose obligations on their owners, 
aimed to protect public interests. See art. 14 Nr. (1)–(3) GG, available at 
http://www.iuscomp.org/gla (last visited Jan. 24, 2004); Gunnar F. Schuppert, The Right 
to Property, in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 107, 107–18 
(Ulrich Karpen ed., 1988).  It was held by a German court that injury to the property right 
is justified only for the sake of a public interest, after balancing the rights in conflict, and 
that such injury should be minimized according to the importance of the public interest at 
stake.  See DAVIES, supra note 16, at 121–27; DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 276 (1989) 
(providing case examples of German courts balancing these issues).  A German case, 
known as the School Book Case, challenged a specific exemption to copyright, which 
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to participate in cultural life is cited as the first right by the 
Universal Declaration,199 and the right of the author with respect to 
his or her work is cited second.200  This order is not accidental.201  
It supports the view that the right to participate in cultural life is 
the primary rule, and it is restricted by the individual’s 
copyright.202  Namely, conferring full significance on the right of 
participation means acknowledgment of a general right of 
everyone to participate in cultural life, except for the duty to 
refrain from doing so in certain cases, which are determined 
 
allowed preparation of compilations for schools for educational purposes.  It was held 
that the constitutional protection of copyright, as a kind of property right, does not 
guarantee the copyright owner’s absolute control over all exploitation of his of her work, 
and it was recommended that the legislature codify the proper balance between the 
author’s interests and public interest.  Public interest in free access to cultural values 
justifies said exemption to copyright, but the author should not be deprived from the right 
of payment for such use of his or her work.  The author should not be obliged to accept 
free use of his or her work only because such use is in the public interest, even if it is for 
educational interests. See In re Kästner et al., BVerfGE 31, 229 (1971); KOMMERS, at 
271–75.  The meaning of this decision is that in many cases, limitations to copyright that 
are a result of the need to balance conflicting interests should be determined as a 
compulsory license that enables use of a work subject to payment. See DAVID P. CURRIE, 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 298–99 (1994); Matthias 
Ruete, The ‘Kirchenmusik’ Judgment, Constitutional and Intellectual Property Rights, 2 
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 198, 198–99 (1980). 
199 Article 27(1) states: “Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of 
the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.” 
Universal Declaration, supra note 5. 
200 Article 27(2) states: “Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and 
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he 
is the author.” Id. 
201 Although the Universal Declaration is not a treaty signed by states, the rules of 
treaties’ interpretation are applicable, with cautions due to its special status.  The 
interpretive rules of treaties are codified in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 
art. 31(3), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2004).  One of the interpretive rules of treaties is the literal 
interpretation rule, according to which one must inspect the relevant norms in any treaty 
according to the order of their codification.  Furthermore, the context, syntax, and 
wording should be taken into consideration. See MYRES S. MCDOUGAL ET AL., THE 
INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: 
PRINCIPLES OF CONTENT AND PROCEDURE 121, 273 (2d prtg. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
1994) (1967).  The different means for treaties’ interpretation, however, are aiding tools 
for revealing the parties’ true intent. See LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 366 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986). 
202 MCNAIR, supra note 201. 
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according to the need to protect the material and moral interests of 
the author. 
Giving the public’s cultural rights their proper importance may 
have great influence.  Despite the pressure to enlarge copyright 
according to Article 27(2), there will be an emphasis on the need to 
restrain this enlargement in order to implement the right of access 
and participation under Article 27(1).203  It also might be that such 
an inversion of priorities will lead to the same result existing in a 
system of exemptions to copyright; nevertheless, situating the right 
of participation as the primary right might be crucial in difficult 
decisions.  In any case, it should be noted that the proposition of 
inversing the relation between the two rights at stake has no basis 
in actual law.204  The U.S. Constitution places the public’s interest 
first, and so it is not an example of a law that implements such a 
list of priorities.  In the Constitution, the  superiority of public 
interest stems from utilitarian theory and not from natural law 
perception regarding the priorities of natural and basic liberties.205  
In international instruments and activities, however, the right to 
participate in cultural life, as a human right, is what is being 
stressed.206 
Deciding which of the two rights is primary, and thus 
prevailing, would be rash.  Human rights are relative and not 
absolute.207  Describing human rights as absolutes reflects a 
guiding principle and not a specific rule.208  Implementation of the 
 
203 See DAVIES, supra note 16, at 4 (discussing the twofold purpose of copyright 
systems); JEREMY J. PHILLIPS ET AL., WHALE ON COPYRIGHT 17 (4th ed., Sweet & 
Maxwell 1993); STEWART, supra note 36, at 5; Chapman, supra note 56, at 153–56 
(discussing the history of protections and creator rewards for database compilation); Yen, 
supra note 9, at 559 n.241. 
204 See Chapman, supra note 56, at 161–62 (discussing the need for intellectual property 
lawmakers to undertake human rights as well as economic concerns in the future). 
205 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also Drahos, Origins and Development, supra note 
104, at 30–32. 
206 For a review on such different activities and international instruments, see 
Symonides, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 176–79, 181–86, 189–90. See also supra 
note 79. 
207 Dinstein, supra note 59, at 79. 
208 See Jerome J. Shestack, The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS: CONCEPTS AND STANDARDS 175, at 32–35, 44 (Janusz Symonides ed., 2000) 
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guiding principle of any human right is made by setting limits to 
the right, even if such limitations do not appear explicitly in the 
articulation of the right.209  While shaping the scope of one human 
right, other human rights should be taken into account.  Therefore, 
unless there is a severe and unresolved conflict between two rights, 
both rights should be embedded into a more or less coexisting 
pattern of norms. 
Whatever the way of resolving the conflict between the two 
rights proclaimed in Article 27 may be, the fact that both are 
recognized as human rights should in itself lessen the apprehension 
of using Article 27 to insert natural law considerations into 
domestic copyright law.  The Universal Declaration acknowledges 
both the interest of the author with respect to his or her work and 
the interest of members of the public to enjoy works.210  Therefore, 
the fear of bias in favor of one of the interests, especially in favor 
of the author’s rights, is relieved.  Article 27 can be used as a 
normative source for natural law consideration enhancing each one 
of the conflicting rights.211  Therefore, Article 27 can be used for 
balanced introduction of natural law considerations into domestic 
law, as well as a means for balanced development of copyright 
law. 
Section A posed the question of why a mechanism to insert 
natural law considerations into copyright law is needed.  If Article 
27 is used as a normative source for natural law considerations 
enhancing each one of the conflicting rights, another nourishing 
layer will be added to the theoretical discourse of copyright law.  
The practical meaning of this proposal is that in proper cases 
attention will be given to the extent of an interest from the point of 
view of human rights.  This will confer proper weight to the liberty 
to participate in cultural life on one hand, and to the material and 
 
(discussing the nature of human rights and distinguishing the core principles affirmed in 
human rights from the system of rights sought by international law). 
209 For example, Dinstein points out two restrictions relating to intellectual property 
rights, such as human rights, which also apply to other human rights: (1) prohibition on 
misuse of human rights (a principle that is also proclaimed in article 30 of the Universal 
Declaration); (2) restriction of human rights in time of war or emergency. See Dinstein, 
supra note 59, at 80. 
210 Universal Declaration, supra note 5. 
211 For this conclusion, see infra text accompanying notes 279–81. 
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moral interests of the author on the other.  After all, the reason for 
the inclusion of economic rights, including copyright, into the 
Universal Declaration despite the initial objection of some of the 
party states is due, inter alia, to the understanding that in some 
areas within the economic field, robust moral considerations 
function as guidance for individual as well as institutional 
behavior.212  In these areas, basing decisions only in terms of 
economic gain is improper.213  In other words, the economic 
human right can enrich the considerations taken into account while 
shaping an economic norm by adding moral aspects to the 
utilitarian ones.  Hence, in the task of norm configuration, an effort 
should be made to settle the conflict between the different interests 
until a proper balance is achieved, and not to reject moral or 
natural law considerations entirely. 
For example, in certain cases in which the personal interest of 
an author with respect to his or her work is remarkable, as part of 
the expectation to have control over the external reflection of his or 
her personality, proper importance should be given to such interest 
as a human right, despite the utilitarian interest to limit such 
control for the sake of public benefit.214  In contrast, in other cases 
the basic right of members of the public to be exposed to works, or 
even to exploit them as part of creative activity, should be given 
proper weight, despite utilitarian interest to encourage creation of 
works by conferring exclusive rights on authors.215  These 
 
212 See NICKEL, supra note 119, at 49. 
213 This explanation was suggested by Nickel. See id. 
214 A more concrete example might be when artists wish to control the way their works 
are communicated to the public, and to prevent the media corporation that performs the 
work publicly to “edit” the work for its convenience in order to embed commercials. See 
Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14 (1976) (The Monty Python comedy troupe sued the ABC 
network due to its film editing for insertion of commercial breaks and obscenity.  The 
troupe had to use contractual tools, however, to prevent such modification and protect its 
so called personal artistic interest); Graber & Tubner, supra note 195, at 61–62 
(describing a dispute between the famous cinema director, Fellini, and the “media 
tycoon,” Berlusconi, where the director sued Berlusconi contending that numerous 
commercial breaks embedded into his film had interrupted the flow of the film’s artistic 
message and hence distorted it).  This kind of interest is protected in many countries via 
the “integrity right, which is one of the known moral rights.  For more on moral rights, 
see supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
215 In this contrary situation, a more concrete example might be cases acknowledging a 
large “Lending Right,” enabling authors to prevent lending of lawful copies of their 
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examples demonstrate that in any case, utilitarian considerations 
can be manipulated in order to achieve the desired result, whether 
by emphasizing the public need in restraining copyright or by 
emphasizing the social need to give incentives for creative activity.  
Therefore, considering natural law interests, and reference to the 
rights of access and participation of members of the public as well 
as to an author’s right as human rights, might enrich and deepen 
the copyright discourse, without necessarily causing a dramatic 
change in existing balance of interests.  As discussed above, this 
naturalistic discourse is important, even though it might not change 
 
works in public libraries.  Vast acknowledgement of such a right might be problematic, if 
the right to participate in cultural life is taken into consideration.  It should be mentioned 
that, due to the fear that vast lending rights may impose an inappropriate interference 
with the availability and accessibility of books and other cultural goods in public 
libraries, the E.C. Directive on the subject left the member states flexibility with respect 
to legislation on lending rights, including the option to shape the lending rights to 
equitable remuneration, instead of an exclusive right enabling authors to prevent lending 
of copies of their works. See JÖRG REINBOTHE & SILKE VON LEWINSKI, THE E.C. 
DIRECTIVE ON RENTAL AND LENDING RIGHTS AND ON PIRACY 12–13 (1993).  By the same 
token, article 11 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, which is part of the World Trade Organization scheme, obliges contracting states 
to acknowledge only a right to authorize or to prohibit commercial rental to the public, 
and such right relates only to computer programs, cinematographic works, and sound 
recordings. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) 
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].  Another somewhat surprising example concerns the 
issue of extending the copyright term, which was challenged in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 
U.S. 186 (2003).  The dichotomy presented in the Court’s holding, both by opinion of the 
Court and by dissenting opinions, is that extension of the copyright term complies with 
private interests and the question is whether in the long run such an extension will also 
comply with the public interest, which is the objective of the constitutional copyright 
clause.  According to the opinion of the Court, the Court should not interfere with 
Congress’ decisions as to how best to achieve the public’s interests, and according to 
dissenting opinions such extension does not serve the public’s welfare. Id.  Such a 
dichotomy of argumentation presents only one side of the coin.  Human rights 
conceptions might also have insights on the subject matter.  Thus, even though extension 
of the copyright term might be justified by acknowledging the author’s natural material 
rights, such extension might be problematic due to acknowledging the basic human right 
of members of the public to enjoy culture and to participate in cultural life.  Therefore, 
also according to natural law philosophies, there is a debate over whether extending the 
copyright term is justified.  In addition, taking into consideration the naturalistic point of 
view might not change the final resolution; it might enrich and nourish the discourse, or 
might even change the balance of interests in favor of the public’s right to participate in 
cultural life.  As a consequence, it would lead to denial of such term extension. 
4 AFORI FORMAT 3/31/2004  4:13 PM 
2004] NATURAL LAW IN AMERICAN COPYRIGHT 547 
 
the existing positive balance of interests, because it will advance 
legal transparency and will bring “natural impulse” reasoning to 
light. 
It should be mentioned in this context that when the Universal 
Declaration was announced in 1948, it reflected the values of 
natural law regarding the claims of individuals against the state, 
which represented society.216  Today, however, when centers of 
power have been transferred from the state to the open market, 
adjustments to the interpretation of the Universal Declaration 
should be made to limit the power of large-scale corporations, as 
opposed to the state.  As mentioned above, the Universal 
Declaration does not bind states, but society as a whole.  
Therefore, such interpretive adjustments are possible and proper.217  
Such an adjustment of Article 27 might be valuable in typical legal 
rivalries because it can empower authors and users of works by 
giving them legal tools in the battle against the large media 
corporations that, to a great extent, control cultural production and 
consumption.218  This is another answer to the question of why a 
mechanism for inserting natural law perceptions into the copyright 
arena is needed.  Natural law considerations are mostly relevant for 
preserving individuals’ interests vis-à-vis large media corporations, 
and without such a mechanism courts will lack a powerful tool for 
achieving justice.219 
 
216 Samuel K. Murumba, Introduction to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights at 
50 and the Challenge of Global Markets: Themes and Variations, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 
5, 6 (1999). 
217 Id.; see also Dessemontet, supra note 55, at 114–15 (discussing the direct application 
of Article 27 in French courts to defend artists’ moral rights in two examples, including 
one where a Charlie Chaplin film was changed by the addition of an unauthorized 
soundtrack and colorization). 
218 For the proposition that constitutional protection of artistic interests should be shifted 
so as to constrain the power of large private economical entities, such as protecting artists 
from the large media corporations which control the public performance of their works, 
see Graber & Tubner, supra note 195, at 68–71, 72. 
219 A good example for the relevance of natural law consideration in the relations 
between individual authors and large media corporations is in the Tasini case, described 
supra note 168.  In this case, the Court was concerned with protection of the rights of 
freelance journalists against their publishers’ use of their articles.  The anchor of the 
Court decision is the statute itself, i.e. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c), which reflects, inter alia, 
naturalistic perceptions. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 496 n.3 (2001).  
Had the Court been equipped with the proposed mechanism for inserting natural law 
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D.  The Constitutional Problem in the United States 
The above sections discussed the potential of using Article 27 
of the Universal Declaration as a means for inserting natural law 
considerations into the American copyright discourse.  The 
question to be asked at this stage is whether such use of Article 27 
is permissible according to the U.S. Constitution.  The Copyright 
Clause of the Constitution empowers Congress to legislate 
copyright law to promote  the progress of science and the useful 
arts.220  The Supreme Court has interpreted this clause as a 
mandate to shape copyright law according to utilitarian 
considerations.221  Therefore, the question is whether introduction 
of Article 27 of the Universal Declaration, which is based on 
natural law values, into American copyright discourse contradicts 
the Copyright Clause’s utilitarian command.  The basic rule in 
American law is that the Constitution supersedes any other law, 
federal or state, and any treaty or international obligation of the 
United States.222  Taking this into account, the following sections 
will outline propositions enabling the insertion of Article 27 of the 
Universal Declaration into American copyright discourse in a 
manner compatible with the Constitution.  According to these 
propositions the Copyright Clause allows pluralistic 
considerations, to some extent, and Article 27 functions as the 
engine of the mechanism injecting natural law perceptions within 
such considerations. 
 
considerations into American copyright law, the reasoning might have been more 
enriching. 
220 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
221 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994); Feist Publ’ns, 
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991); Sony Corp. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (discussing the objective of copyright monopoly 
which lies in the public benefit from the labor of authors); see also NIMMER & NIMMER, 
supra note 13, § 1.03[A].  For a thorough review of the steadfast rejection of the natural 
law theory of copyright by the Court, due to the interpretation given to the constitutional 
clause, see Marci Hamilton, Copyright at the Supreme Court: A Jurisprudence of 
Deference, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 317 (2000). 
222 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.  Therefore, the Constitution also supersedes customary 
international law, sometimes viewed as part of common law. See RESTATEMENT OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 72, § 701–02. 
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1. Interpreting the Constitutional Copyright Clause as Not 
Totally Rejecting Natural Law Conceptions 
To answer the question regarding the relationship between the 
Copyright Clause and Article 27 of the Universal Declaration, one 
must heavily depend upon the interpretation given to the Copyright 
Clause.  Thus, part of the question is whether the Copyright Clause 
should be interpreted as non-flexible and completely rejecting any 
consideration of natural law values in the framework of copyright, 
or whether is there some interpretive way of embedding natural 
law considerations within the constitutional framework.223 
There is an academic debate as to how the Supreme Court 
should interpret the Constitution, and as to the weight that should 
be given to the language of the text and the purported intention of 
the Framers in construing the meaning of a particular provision.224  
The basic tension is between “originalism,” a method of 
interpreting the Constitution that concentrates on the original text 
and the Framers’ intentions, and “policy-making,” a method of 
interpretation concentrating on revealing the fundamental values of 
the Constitution and examining the purpose served by any 
particular provision therein.225  In practice, the Court’s 
constitutional interpretation is predisposed to the “policy-making” 
school,226 especially with regard to the Copyright Clause.227  Thus, 
 
223 The interpretation of the Constitution is a primary source of American constitutional 
law, because the provisions of the Constitution are general and broadly phrased and the 
actual meaning depends on how they have been interpreted by the Court. See ROBERT A. 
SEDLER, UNITED STATES – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5 INT’L ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS 35 
(Kluwer Law International 2000) [hereinafter SEDLER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]. 
224 See ROBERT S. PECK, THE BILL OF RIGHTS & THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 151–
52 (1992) (discussing academic debate). 
225 See a collection of essays on this issue in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Mark V. Tushnet 
ed., 1992) (collected essays on constitutional interpretation); WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 289–316 (1st ed. 1986) (addressing 
approaches, modes, and techniques to constitutional interpretation); PECK, supra note 
224, at chs. 10–12 (1992) (discussing the interpretive trends of originalism and 
textualism). 
226 See SEDLER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 223, at 35 n.1 
227 See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57–58, 60 (1884) 
(interpreting the word “writings” in the constitutional copyright clause as encompassing 
photographs, because such interpretation is in accordance with the purpose of the clause).  
For more on the interpretation of the constitutional copyright clause by the Supreme 
Court, see Hamilton, supra note 221, at 336–40. 
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the first explanation, outlined in Subsection (a) below, concentrates 
on the policy-making method and argues that revealing the 
fundamental values of the Copyright Clause and searching for the 
purpose it serves leads to the conclusion that the clause does not 
necessarily reject natural law philosophy entirely.  The second 
explanation, outlined in Subsection (b) below, follows the 
originalism method,228 claiming that the Framers’ original intent 
was not to reject natural law philosophy in the field of intellectual 
property rights.  This Essay’s proposal for settling the apparent 
conflict between the Constitution’s utilitarian command and the 
natural law perceptions reflected in Article 27 of the Universal 
Declaration may also be described as not applying the interpretive 
rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius229 with regard to the 
Copyright Clause.230  This Essay’s contention is that the Copyright 
Clause does not totally exclude natural law considerations.  Such 
interpretation is supported by either policy-making interpretation, 
seeking to reveal the purpose of the constitutional command, or by 
originalistic interpretation, tracking the legislative history of the 
Copyright Clause.231 
a) The Utilitarian Objective Is Not Decisive Regarding the 
Specific Way of Achieving It 
The first way to reconcile the Copyright Clause with natural 
law perceptions is by interpreting the clause so that it explains the 
aim of copyright law, but does not determine a fixed standard of 
means to be used in shaping copyright.232  This insight leads to a 
 
228 See PECK, supra note 224, at 161–78 (discussing originalism). 
229 [Latin] “[T]o express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other . . . .” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 476 (7th ed. 2000). 
230 For this interpretive rule, see MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 188, at 418.  In 
this context it should be borne in mind that according to the Ninth Amendment of the 
Constitution, the enumeration of certain rights in the Constitution shall not prejudice 
other rights not so enumerated. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
231 See PECK, supra note 224 (discussing originalism). 
232 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 1.03; see also Paul M. Schwartz & William M. 
Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term Extension and Intellectual Property as 
Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331, 2336 (2003) (“Like numerous 
constitutional texts, these few words lead to innumerable debates. . . . If Congress’s 
power to provide copyright or patent protection is only proper if the exercise of that 
power advances certain ends, how tight must the fit between means and ends be?”). 
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possible philosophical standpoint from which to solve the conflict, 
so that both utilitarian and natural law justifications can be used in 
the field of copyright law.  According to utilitarian theory, the goal 
is to achieve a social situation that benefits as many people as 
possible, and as a result, the optimal welfare of society as a whole 
is attained.233  Nevertheless, the utilitarian approach does not 
decide how to determine what  people’s benefit is.  Although 
economic or monetary tools are common measures of individual 
and aggregate welfare, they are not the only ones.234  Thus, 
possibly, if the protection of the natural rights of as many people in 
society as possible is achieved, optimal utilitarian welfare may be 
attained.235  In other words, utilitarian considerations do not 
 
233 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20 (Harvard Univ. Press 1999) (“The main 
idea is that society is rightly ordered, and therefore just, when its major institutions are 
arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over all the 
individuals belonging to it.”) (citation omitted).  For this basic utilitarian paradigm used 
with respect to justification of property rights in general, see BECKER, supra note 15, at 
57–67; MUNZER, supra note 15, at 196–98. See also Frank J. Garcia, Global Trade Issues 
in the New Millennium: Building a Just Trade Order for a New Millennium, 33 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1015, 1030 (2001) (“Utilitarian theory provides that an act will be 
right insofar as it maximizes utility, here defined as the satisfaction of preferences.  
Essentially, utilitarianism claims that the principle of utility maximization follows 
naturally and compellingly from the simple fact that people have preferences and are 
happier to the extent to which such preferences are satisfied.”). 
234 See Ruth Gana Okediji, Perspectives on Globalization from Developing States: 
Copyright and Public Welfare in Global Perspective, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 117, 
137 (1999) (stating, in the context of international economic policies and free trade, 
“[t]he market mechanism fails to yield true measurements of social welfare because it 
cannot account for values which shape an individual’s desires, and which must be 
accounted for in the calculation of social optimum”) (citation omitted). 
235 A central criticism of the utilitarian-economic approach, in general, and to copyright 
in particular is that wealth maximization raises the issue of resource allocation in society, 
and such allocation is dependent on distributive justice values.  Therefore, a discussion 
according to the utilitarian-economic approach will be circular, because the basic 
decisions are made according to values that are external to this approach.  Furthermore, 
the emphasis on economic efficiency has been criticized as ignoring additional socially 
important interests which cannot be estimated by economic or monetary tools.  Therefore, 
such emphasis does not necessarily promote the benefit of as many people in society. See 
Gordon, Inquiry into Copyright Merits, supra note 16, at 1439; Neil Weinstock Netanel, 
Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 288 (1996); Yen, supra 
note 9, at 541; see also WALDRON, supra note 17, at 13.  The common answer to this 
criticism is that economic tests aid in identifying the point of maximum social welfare, 
which also reflects non-monetary values. See BECKER, supra note 15, at 67–74; Stanley 
M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual 
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necessarily reject the consideration of natural law values.236  The 
Supreme Court also has stressed that the immediate impact of 
copyright is conferring reward to the author, and the long-term aim 
of such reward is to advance public welfare.237  And recently, in 
the same context, the Court again has stressed that it is for 
Congress to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause’s 
objectives,238 referring to an enactment furthering the reward given 
to authors.239  It should be admitted, however, that although such 
an approach enables the embedding of natural law considerations 
within the constitutional framework, it grades natural law 
justification for copyright as inferior to the utilitarian one, and not 
as a pari passu justification.  Adherents of the natural law 
justification for copyright might view this result as the lesser evil, 
and utilitarians as an unavoidable concession.240 
It can further be argued that the utilitarian justification for 
copyright expressed in the U.S. Constitution is an example of what 
 
Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 5 (1991).  Another common answer is that economic 
efficiency is a central but not exclusive tool to determine ways of operation in order to 
promote social welfare. See BECKER, supra note 15, at 57–67; Gordon, Inquiry into 
Copyright Merits, supra note 16, at 1388 n.206; Parchomovsky, supra note 182, at 354–
55.  Hence, even according to adherents of the utilitarian-economic approach, welfare 
maximization means considering, inter alia, non-utilitarian economic considerations. 
236 See id. 
237 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003); N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 
533 U.S. 483, 496 n.3 (2001); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); see also 
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (discussing reward to 
public); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 1.03[A]; L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY 
W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHT 47–55 (1991). 
238 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204, 208, 222 (2003) (affirming the time extension of the 
copyright term by Congress). 
239 See id. at 205–07 (describing the benefits of term extension to authors). 
240 For an opposite view, according to which the language of the constitutional 
copyright clause clearly indicates that copyright power is limited and Congress cannot 
consider natural law proprietary rights for authors, see L. Ray Patterson, Understanding 
the Copyright Clause, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 365, 369–74 (2000).  This view 
follows Patterson’s conclusion that, according to the textual analysis of the clause, it 
contains three ideas with regard to copyright: (1) copyright is not to be used for 
censorship; (2) copyright protects public domain; and (3) copyright provides public 
access to learning materials. See id. at 367–68.  As explained in the text above, in my 
view the clause should not be interpreted as limiting the ways to achieve final welfare, 
and it does not totally exclude naturalistic proprietary interests from copyright’s menu of 
considerations.  Such a conclusion is also supported by the Court’s holdings. See supra 
note 237. 
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legal theorist John Rawls calls “overlapping consensus.”241  
Namely, the Copyright Clause comprises the general framework or 
basic construction within which a variety of values might be 
integrated.  The constitutional framework reflects the lowest 
common denominator of consensus, but it does not mean that in all 
cases other values should necessarily be rejected.  Tracking the 
history of the Constitution reveals that the Copyright Clause itself 
is not made out of one cloth, and that there was no consensus 
among the Framers with respect to the theoretical justifications for 
copyright.242  This bolsters the notion that the Copyright Clause is 
 
241 John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4–
5 (1987). 
242 Edward C. Walterscheid’s research on the history of the copyright clause shows that 
it is not made out of one cloth, and that its theoretical basis of codifying is complex. See 
Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The 
Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States 
Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 44–48 (1994) [hereinafter Walterscheid, Origin of 
the IP Clause].  Walterscheid claims that the first initiative to codify a clause 
empowering Congress to confer rights to authors and inventors was made by James 
Madison, who was especially interested in protection of scholars’ interests. See id. at 47–
48.  Recently, the Supreme Court has also referred to Madison’s insights with respect to 
copyright’s objectives, according to which “in copyright ‘[t]he public good fully 
coincides . . . with the claims of individuals.’” See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 n.18; see also 
Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 232, at 2385 (“[James Madison] did not view the 
purpose of the Copyright Clause as limited to encouragement of future production. . . . 
Madison was interested in a notion of reward for authors; he speaks of ‘recompence’ and 
‘compensation for a benefit’ that could have been withheld.  Also significantly, 
Madison’s focus with respect to the ‘limited Times’ provision is on patents, not 
copyrights. ‘The limitation is particularly proper,’ he writes, ‘in the case of inventions.’”) 
(citation omitted); Damstedt, supra note 37, at 1179 (“Lockean natural rights informed 
the Framers’ understanding of intellectual property law.”) (citations omitted).  For more 
on Madison’s influence on the clause, see PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 237, at 
53–54.  For a thorough review of the history of the copyright clause, illustrating its 
complex underpinnings, see Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 232, at 2375–90 
(concluding that the view according to which Framers intended the copyright clause to 
limit tightly Congress powers, and bind to pure utilitarian consideration is inaccurate and 
incompatible with historical facts).  For more on the history of the clause, see Tyler T. 
Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and Copyright Clause, 49 
J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 675, 685–95 (2002).  Nimmer and Nimmer have also noted 
that the Founders did not reject the view that copyright is a natural right. See NIMMER & 
NIMMER, supra note 13, § 1.03[A].  They further note that the constitutional command to 
limit the term of intellectual property rights is aimed to strike a balance between the 
interest of the author in the fruits of his or her labor and the public interest in free access 
to materials needed for the development of society. See id. § 1.05[D].  In other words, the 
clause intends to balance the “natural” interests of the author and the “utilitarian” 
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outlined so as to contain a variety of values and philosophical 
attitudes, and is, therefore, a fruit of consent to articulate a 
provision encompassing incommensurable concepts, namely both 
utilitarian and naturalistic objectives.243  According to Rawls, an 
overlapping consensus containing utilitarian concepts, while 
problematic, is made possible by integrating the other concepts as 
a means to achieve the greatest welfare.244 
If using these philosophical arguments to interpret the 
Copyright Clause,  then the introduction of the underpinnings of 
Article 27 of the Universal Declaration into American copyright 
law is proper and suitable, especially in light of the view expressed 
above: that the interpretation of domestic laws, including the 
constitutional provisions, should be aided by human rights norms, 
especially if they involve similar rights.  As explained, it is 
possible to view human rights as a positive external source of law 
and, therefore, the Constitution should be interpreted according to 
a broader context other than a purely domestic one.245  
Furthermore, it is established that in cases of ambiguity the 
domestic norm should be interpreted in a way consistent with the 
law of all peoples, namely international law.246  Therefore, if 
possible, Article 27 should influence the interpretation given to 
domestic copyright law, even though it might not be regarded as 
binding international law.  Hence, there exist both a legitimization 
in the Copyright Clause, allowing pluralistic consideration with 
 
interests of society.  For further discussion on the legislative history of the constitutional 
clause, see infra Part II.C. 
For an opposite view with regard to the origins of the constitutional clause, as purely 
based on public welfare objectives, see Patterson, supra note 240, at 374–84.  For a 
further review of such opposite views, see Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 232, at 2339–
42 (reviewing the “intellectual property restrictors” originalist and textualist 
interpretation of the copyright clause). 
243 As John Rawls explains, overlapping consensus is not a mere modus vivendi, because 
it includes within one workable framework incommensurable philosophies, such as 
different religions.  Therefore, the outcome of overlapping consensus is not a 
compromise, which is the outcome of political bargaining, but rather an agreement to 
encompass all concepts. See Rawls, supra note 241 at 9–12. 
244 See id. at 12. 
245 See supra note 190 (concerning Prof. Christenson’s proposal). 
246 See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 72, § 114 (according to which, 
where it is fair, a U.S. statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with international 
law). 
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regard to copyright, and a positive mechanism to accept the 
perceptions reflected in Article 27 into the clause. 
b) Interpreting the Constitutional Copyright Clause 
According to Its Legislative History 
The possibility of integrating natural law considerations into 
American copyright law, within the constitutional framework, is 
also supported by the legislative history of the constitutional 
Copyright Clause.247  As already mentioned above,248 the history 
of the Constitution reveals that the Copyright Clause itself is not 
made out of one cloth, and it had complex underpinnings, 
including natural law ones.249  Furthermore, Professor Edward C. 
Walterscheid argues that the aim of the Copyright Clause is to 
emphasize the issue of setting a time limitation to the rights.250  
Namely, the need for a clause in the Constitution concerning 
intellectual property rights arose for the purpose of determining 
explicitly and specifically that the correct way to promote science 
and useful arts is by limiting the right vested with respect to such 
intangible resources.251  Beyond this, there is no need for an 
explicit constitutional mandate to regulate the protection of 
intellectual assets, because Congress is empowered to do so under 
its general regulative authority.252  Additionally, there are many 
 
247 For a review of an opposite view with respect to the legislative history, see Schwartz 
& Treanor, supra note 232, at 2339–42 (reviewing the “intellectual property restrictors” 
originalist and textualist interpretation of the copyright clause). See also Ruth Okediji, 
Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 75, 94–95 
(2000); Patterson, supra note 240, at 374–84. 
248 See supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
249 Id.; see NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 1.03[A]; Schwartz & Treanor, supra 
note 232, at 2375–90; Walterscheid, Origin of the IP Clause, supra note 242, at 44–48. 
250 See Edward C. Walterscheid, Defining the Patent and Copyright Term: Term Limits 
and the Intellectual Property Clause, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 315 (2000) [hereinafter 
Walterscheid, Term Limits and the IP Clause]. 
251 Id. at 316. 
252 For example, Congress could do so under its power to regulate commerce.  For a 
similar conclusion, see Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 232, at 2387 (“The interpretive 
approach reflected in these views about incorporation would suggest that for many, and 
perhaps most, of the Founders, the Copyright Clause was a clarification of a 
congressional power already existing under the Commerce Clause, perhaps in 
conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause, rather than a vesting of a new power 
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different ways to promote science and useful arts, aside from non-
perpetuity of intellectual property rights.253  It is, therefore, 
claimed that the inclusion of the Copyright Clause in the 
Constitution was done mainly over fear that without it Congress 
would lack the power to set a time limitation on intellectual 
property rights.254  Another asserted reason for the inclusion of the 
Copyright Clause in the Constitution is that it aimed to include the 
regulation of intellectual property in the federal sphere and not 
leave the subject to state regulation.255  As a result of this historical 
process, it is possible to argue that the clause is not specifically 
aimed to prevent considering natural law conceptions within the 
framework of copyright law.  The Copyright Clause had objectives 
other than limiting the range of theoretical underpinnings of 
copyright.  Therefore, it should not be interpreted as barring the 
introduction of natural law considerations into copyright law. 
2. Alternative Constitutional Basis 
Aside from the interpretative ways of inserting natural law 
conceptions reflected in Article 27 of the Universal Declaration 
into the framework of the Copyright Clause, as suggested above, 
uncertainty remains as to whether there is an alternative 
constitutional basis for introducing natural law philosophy into the 
intellectual property field, and furthermore, whether such 
circumvention of the Copyright Clause is possible. 
a) Possibilities for an Alternative Constitutional Basis 
As to the first question, whether there is an alternative 
constitutional basis for acknowledging copyright as a human right 
 
in Congress.”).  For more about Congress’s power in this context, see infra notes 271–73 
and accompanying text. 
253 Walterscheid, Terms Limits and the IP Clause, supra note 250, at 316. 
254 Walterscheid, Origin of the IP Clause, supra note 242, at 33–34; Walterscheid, Term 
Limits and the IP Clause, supra note 250, at 318–20.  For an opposite view with regard to 
the origins of the constitutional clause, as aimed to limit the power of Congress with 
policies to promote learning, namely to consider only public welfare objectives, see 
Patterson, supra note 240, at 374–84. 
255 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 1.01; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, A Wiseguy’s 
Approach to Information Products: Muscling Copyright and Patent into a Unitary 
Theory of Intellectual Property, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 195, 231 (1992). 
4 AFORI FORMAT 3/31/2004  4:13 PM 
2004] NATURAL LAW IN AMERICAN COPYRIGHT 557 
 
according to natural law perceptions, one must turn, arguendo, to 
the Fifth Amendment protection of property.256  As explained 
above, in Part I.F, the interests protected by copyright as a human 
right might also be protected, at large, through the vast property 
right also acknowledged in the Universal Declaration.  In other 
words, the large scope of protection of property rights might 
include protection of intellectual property rights in general and 
copyright in particular.  Therefore, it could be argued that 
protection of copyright as a property right, considering inter alia 
natural law considerations, could be achieved via the constitutional 
status of property rights.  This vast topic of the constitutional status 
of property rights in American law is undoubtedly beyond of the 
scope of this Essay.257  Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
constitutional protection of property is interpreted broadly as 
embracing intangible property as well,258 and stems also from 
 
256 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . private property . . . shall not be taken for public use 
without just compensation.”). 
257 For a general review of the constitutional protection of property, see ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPALS AND POLICIES 504–24 (1997).  For a 
critical review of the legislative history of the Fifth Amendment, see H.N. Scheiber, The 
“Takings” Clause and the Fifth Amendment: Original Intent and Significance in 
American Legal Development, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT 
UNDERSTANDING 233 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed., 1991).  For the difficulties underlying 
the doctrinal conception of property right’s status, see Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings 
Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1301 (1989). See also Frank 
Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097 (1981). 
258 The Supreme Court held that trade secrets were property within the meaning of the 
Fifth Amendment. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002–04 (1984).  
For the broad interpretation given to the term “property,” including intangible proprietary 
interests, see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 257, at 505, 519–22.  According to some 
scholars, however, copyright should be characterized as speech regulation, rather than 
property right. See Netanel, Locating Copyright, supra note 153, at 39 (“Copyright is 
often characterized as a property right.  As such, to some, copyright doesn’t sound like 
censorship, just people enforcing their lawful property rights.  To be certain, rights in real 
property do enjoy at least qualified First Amendment immunity.  One cannot generally 
trespass on privately-owned land in order to speak.  But that, in First Amendment terms, 
is because real property rights are general regulations that impose only isolated and 
incidental burdens on speech.  Where property rights are not in land, but in information, 
expression, or communicative capacity, they are more properly characterized as speech 
regulations.”) (citations omitted); Lemley & Volokh, supra note 153, at 184 
(“Furthermore, consumption of intellectual property, unlike consumption of tangible 
property, is ‘nonrivalrous’—one person’s use of a work does not prevent others from 
using it as well.  This makes intellectual property sufficiently unlike tangible property 
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natural law perceptions.259  Such protection, however, is focused 
on the compensation that should be paid in cases of expropriation 
of private property for public use—known as “taking.”260  
Therefore, bypassing the Copyright Clause through the Fifth 
Amendment might be relevant and operative in particular 
circumstances that are analogous to a taking of a copyright, 
although some interpretive effort would be needed to do so.261  But 
 
that some courts that have faced the issue directly have even concluded that copyrights 
and trademarks are not ‘property’ within the meaning of the Takings Clause.  Whether or 
not that’s correct, the nonrivalrous aspect of intellectual property infringement weakens 
the property rights argument.”) (citations omitted); see also infra note 270. 
259 For the naturalistic roots of the constitutional protection over property, see MURPHY 
ET AL., supra note 225, at 1070–71.  Furthermore, constitutional protection over property 
might also be justified due to the “Personhood Function” of property rights, which is a 
naturalistic justification of property rights. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 257, at 521; C. 
Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. 
L. REV. 741, 746, 761–64 (1986). 
260 Much of the litigation concerning the Fifth Amendment has focused on the question: 
What is a “taking”?  Roughly speaking, there are two kinds of takings: (1) a “possessory” 
taking that occurs when the government confiscates or physically occupies property, and 
(2) a “regulatory” taking that occurs when the government’s regulation leaves no 
reasonably economically viable use of the property. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 257, 
at 506. 
261 For example, courts tend to emphasize the importance of parodies to the public and, 
therefore, approve their creation although they are created through exploiting a pre-
existing work, by the fair use doctrine, codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1996).  Thus, through 
the fair use “regulation,” courts approve the use of someone else’s property for free, for 
the benefit of the public.  It seems that this situation can be seen, through the prism of the 
Fifth Amendment, as a kind of a regulatory taking.  It should be noted that the 
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment might apply in such cases, because the “taking” 
may be considered to be for a “public purpose” even though the taking will also benefit a 
private entity. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 257, at 522–23.  Applying the Fifth 
Amendment in such cases, however, might be problematic due to the Lucas decision, 
holding that regulatory taking occurs in cases where the owner is deprived from any 
reasonable economic use of his or her property. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003 (1992).  For the view that parodist use of a work should not be exempt from 
payment only because it concerns a use that the public is interested in, see Paul 
Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 
U.S.A. 209, 235–36 (1983); Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 67, 73 (1992).  This question becomes more complicated in cases that are not 
clear-cut parodist uses of works, and which are accompanied with big profits gained by 
the user.  The arguments against free use of works could be bolstered by the human rights 
perspective of copyright, according to which it is not fair that another shall enjoy 
something that originated from an author’s labor without paying the author.  It does not 
mean that the user will be silenced and that the public will not enjoy parodies, rather that 
the author of the work being parodied will share some of the profits gained by the user.  
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in other circumstances, it might be even less clear whether the 
Fifth Amendment might function as a separate source of power for 
initial acknowledgement of proprietary rights with regard to 
copyrightable materials. 
Nevertheless, the Fifth Amendment is still an insufficient 
alternative to the Copyright Clause, not only because it might 
apply only to particular circumstances analogized to a taking, but 
also due to the non-proprietary aspects of some of the interests 
authors have with respect to their works.  As explained above in 
Part I.F,262 devoting a special article in the Universal Declaration 
to copyright was not superfluous despite the existence of the 
general property right because there are special interests in the 
field of creation that deserve special attention.  One of these 
interests is the protection of an author’s personal bond with his or 
her work, which is mainly acknowledged in positive law through 
moral right.263  Moreover, as explained above in Part I.E, it was 
suggested that the scope of copyright as a human right be restricted 
only with respect to the aspects of protecting the author’s personal 
interests in his or her work, and these interests are not purely 
proprietary in nature.264  The center of copyright as a human right 
lies in the moral right arena.265  Protection of the personal interests 
of authors, mainly through moral rights, cannot stem from the Fifth 
Amendment precisely because they are not proprietary in nature.266  
Therefore, another constitutional basis for inserting natural law 
values accompanying moral rights must be found. 
 
In other words, the author will get “just compensation” for the use of his or her property.  
As mentioned supra note 198, this attitude was held by the German Supreme Court in the 
School Book Case, regarding a specific exemption in statute.  The author of this Essay 
does not think that allowing parodies through the fair use doctrine codified in federal law, 
however, is necessarily an illegal uncompensated taking.  Rather, when natural law 
considerations are proper, such considerations hypothetically could have been taken into 
account via the window of the Fifth Amendment, if barred at the front door of the 
constitutional copyright clause. 
262 See supra notes 140–43 and accompanying text. 
263 For the content of moral rights, see supra notes 134–37. 
264 See supra notes 140–43 and accompanying text. 
265 But as explained above, this is not only in the moral rights arena. See supra note 137 
and accompanying text. 
266 As explained supra notes 120–22 and accompanying text, the common view is that 
moral rights protect against personal injury, for which the legal means of redress is tort 
law (i.e., libel, slander, etc.), rather than property law. 
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Prima facie, and somewhat ironically, the situation concerning 
moral rights might not be so complicated.  Moral rights represent 
an already “colonized” area of natural law in federal copyright 
law.267  As a result, it also could be argued that the search for an 
alternative constitutional basis for the introduction of natural law 
considerations is unnecessary, with respect to the personal interests 
of an author in his or her work, because Congress already has 
realized its power to acknowledge moral rights.  In other words, 
the legislation of moral rights in federal copyright law serves as the 
gateway for inserting natural law considerations into domestic 
copyright law.  It should be borne in mind, however, that the scope 
of the moral right recognized in American copyright law is narrow 
and only relates to certain visual works.268  This argument is 
problematic for another reason as well.  Specifically, in the 
theoretical search for a constitutional authority for inserting natural 
law considerations into copyright law, the presence of natural law 
considerations in positive copyright law does not prove the 
existence of a constitutional authority.269  To claim so would be to 
assume the solution that is being sought. 
b) Circumvention of the Constitutional Copyright Clause 
Is Futile 
As to whether it is possible to use another constitutional 
provision to add to copyright law perceptions, prima facie, not 
falling within the mandate given by the Copyright Clause, there is 
no clear answer.  The Fifth Amendment as an alternative to the 
intellectual property clause, in this context, has not been 
challenged in court.270  A similar issue, however, has been 
 
267 See supra notes 169–76 and accompanying text. 
268 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1996). 
269 But recently the Supreme Court has acknowledged Congress’s practice of extending 
copyright terms and supported the constitutionality of such acts. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
537 U.S. 186 (2003).  According to Justice Stevens, reliance on congressional practice is 
mistaken, because if the practice is unconstitutional it should be invalidated. See id. at 
235–39 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
270 As far as it is known to the author of this Essay. But see Lemley & Volokh, supra 
note 153, at 184 (stating that “some courts that have faced the issue directly have even 
concluded that copyrights and trademarks are not ‘property’ within the meaning of the 
Takings Clause”).  The cases that authors Mark A. Lemley and Eugene Volokh refer to 
are A. College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense 
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challenged, relating to the possibility of using the constitutional 
commerce clause271 as an alternative to the Copyright Clause.  
Professor David Nimmer explains at length the issue of using the 
commerce clause and other authority under the Constitution to 
enter into treaties as an alternative constitutional mooring for the 
Copyright Clause.272  He refers to the case of United States v. 
Moghadam,273 in which the defendant challenged the argument 
that the criminal anti-bootlegging amendments to the copyright 
statute, enacted according to United States obligations under the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(“TRIPS Agreement”),274 lies outside Congress’s Copyright Clause 
powers.  The Court concluded that the commerce clause might be 
used in order to regulate matters lying within the copyright field, 
especially if such “interference” is not fundamentally inconsistent 
with the Copyright Clause.275  Hence, as Nimmer explains, the 
 
Board, 148 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 144 L. Ed. 2d 575, 589 
(1999), and B. Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 157 F.3d 282, 286, 289 (5th Cir. 1998). Id.  
With respect to the question at stake, whether naturalistic approach could be introduced 
into American copyright law through the Fifth Amendment as an alternative to the 
intellectual property clause, the above-referred decisions are not decisive. 
271 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
272 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, §§ 1.09[A]–[B], 8E.01[B]–[C], 9A.07[B], 
18.06[C][3][a]. 
273 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1036 (2000). 
274 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 215. 
275 United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1279–80 (11th Cir. 1999).  Also, in In 
re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879), the question of using the commerce clause as 
an alternative authority to the intellectual property clause was applied.  The Supreme 
Court held that the challenged trademark law had no connection to the subject matter of 
the intellectual property clause, so the only question was whether the trademark law at 
stake was duly enacted according to the commerce clause.  Therefore, the Moghadam 
court concluded that “the Supreme Court’s analysis in the Trade-Mark Cases stands for 
the proposition that legislation which would not be permitted under the Copyright Clause 
could nonetheless be permitted under the Commerce Clause, provided that the 
independent requirements of the latter are met.” Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1269, 1278.  
Although the Moghadam court concluded that in some circumstances the commerce 
clause can be used by Congress to accomplish something that the intellectual property 
clause might not allow, it cannot be used, however, to eradicate a limitation placed upon 
congressional power in another grant of power.  Therefore, the court evaluated whether 
the anti-bootlegging law was in harmony with the existing scheme that Congress had set 
up under the intellectual property clause. Id. at 1279–80.  Another case to be decided, 
challenging the question of whether the copyright clause has a preemptive effect with 
respect to both the foreign commerce clause and the treaty clause, is Golan v. Ashcroft, 
Civil Action No. 01-B-1854. See Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 232, at 2361 n.195. 
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resolution is that using alternative constitutional mooring for 
achieving objectives that are in harmony with copyright doctrine is 
less problematic than using such alternatives in cases of 
fundamental inconsistency.276 
By the same token, returning to the issue at stake, in order to 
examine whether it is possible to insert natural law values into 
copyright law, for example through the Fifth Amendment, the 
question one should ask is whether natural law perceptions 
regarding copyright as a human right are fundamentally 
inconsistent with copyright doctrine, as reflected in the Copyright 
Clause.  In order to answer this question one must return to square 
one and inspect whether the Copyright Clause praising utilitarian 
aims may bear natural law considerations.  In other words, if the 
possibility to use an alternative constitutional basis for inserting 
natural law considerations into domestic copyright law is 
dependent on whether such considerations are in harmony with the 
copyright scheme under the Copyright Clause, then one must 
return to the basic philosophical question of interpreting the 
Copyright Clause.  Thus returned, the Copyright Clause can be 
interpreted so as to allow the consideration of natural law 
perceptions.277 
Given the decision in United States v. Moghadam, however, it 
is clear that the constitutional adventure outlined above is not that 
helpful.  If the journey outside the Copyright Clause in search of 
an alternative constitutional basis for inserting natural law 
conceptions into domestic copyright law leads one back to the 
internal question of interpreting the Copyright Clause itself, then 
that journey is futile.  Either the Copyright Clause bears natural 
law considerations, or it does not.  If it does, then the insertion of 
 
276 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 1.09[B]; see also Edward C. Walterscheid, 
Confronting the General Welfare Clause and the Intellectual Property Clause, 13 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 87 (1999).  For an objection to the use of an alternative constitutional basis, 
see Cooper Dreyfuss, supra note 255, at 230. 
277 To complete the example given supra note 261 concerning parodies, it could be 
argued that, while inspecting the fair use defense in a specific case, it is not contrary to 
copyright doctrine to take into account considerations that could be labeled as “natural 
law,” such as the right of the author to enjoy the fruits of his or her labor, and other 
personal interests of the author with regard to his or her work.  As mentioned above, 
fairness is not a pure utilitarian term. See supra notes 182, 259. 
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natural law considerations into domestic law may be done directly 
through the Copyright Clause itself, taking into account the 
particular checks and balances of the field, and there is no need to 
explore other constitutional clauses.278  In other words, the key to 
resolving the puzzle of using Article 27 of the Universal 
Declaration as a conduit to insert natural law considerations into 
American copyright law, despite the constitutional command to 
legislate copyright law according to utilitarian end, is to be found 
in the interpretation of such command as not rejecting natural law 
considerations completely, whether through a policy-making kind 
of interpretation or even through that of originalism, as sketched 
above. 
CONCLUSION 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights announces two 
fundamental rights in Article 27: (1) the right of everyone to 
participate in cultural life; and (2) the material and moral rights of 
authors with respect to their works.279  Article 27 has been 
neglected for decades, despite the status and importance of the 
Universal Declaration.  Although the Universal Declaration may 
have no binding authority, it nevertheless functions at least as a 
primary source of inspiration, influencing domestic law, inter alia, 
by way of interpretation.  Taking Article 27 seriously could be 
helpful in the field of copyright, where a constant debate over 
theoretical foundations and justifications is taking place.  
Acknowledgment of human rights is based on natural law 
theories.280  Thus, an additional factor that should be taken into 
account in such a debate is the possible status of the right of people 
to be exposed to works—and in some cases to exploit them—as 
well as the author’s moral and material rights, as human rights.  
The acknowledgement of author’s rights as human rights has been 
 
278 By way of association, the Supreme Court has chosen a similar path in holding that 
the tension between copyright and the freedom of speech interests should be resolved 
within the internal framework of copyright law. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). 
279 See supra notes 5–6. 
280 See supra note 8. 
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criticized.  Nevertheless, a possible compromise is to limit this 
acknowledgement only to the aspects of the right that deals with 
protection of personal interests of authors with respect to their 
works.  Therefore, the human rights discourse is relevant in the 
copyright field. 
This Essay has proposed using Article 27 of the Universal 
Declaration to conduct natural law considerations into American 
copyright law.  The American copyright system stands to gain 
from such a use of Article 27, especially if the complex interests 
expressed in Article 27 are properly comprehended.  Article 27 
embraces a balance of interests between authors’ interests and 
those of the other members of society to enjoy works.  More than 
that, it is possible to interpret Article 27 as emphasizing the right to 
participate in cultural life as the primary right.  Therefore, used 
properly, Article 27 can enrich and enhance the theoretical 
discourse in the field of copyright in a balanced way, allaying the 
fears of favoring authors over users of copyrighted works.  
Furthermore, the adoption of the proposed mechanism, which 
opens an aperture in American copyright law for naturalistic 
philosophy, might also contribute to the system’s transparency.  
That is because the naturalistic considerations, which are in any 
case taken into account, could be legitimized, and as a result 
properly inspected and scrutinized.  Article 27 also can arm both 
authors and users of copyrighted works with legal arguments vis-à-
vis large media corporations and other entrepreneurs controlling 
the cultural market.  Thus, the proposed mechanism to use Article 
27 might nourish the American copyright discourse and have 
promising outcomes. 
Adoption of the proposed mechanism, however, encounters 
prima facie difficulties due to the Copyright Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, which has been interpreted as determining a 
utilitarian framework for copyright.  It is possible to solve the 
problem by interpreting the constitutional Copyright Clause as not 
rejecting natural law considerations completely.  The interpretation 
of the Copyright Clause as not totally excluding natural law 
perceptions can be supported both by legislative history and 
policy-making interpretation.  This interpretive path is possible 
because the Copyright Clause determines the objectives of 
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copyright law, but is not decisive with respect to the way it is to be 
achieved.  Consequently, the utilitarian aim reflected in the 
Copyright Clause both could serve as the lowest common 
denominator of consensus with respect to the general aim of 
copyright law, and at the same time bear natural law 
considerations.  Introduction of the underpinnings of Article 27 
into American domestic copyright law is also proper and suitable 
in light of the view that the interpretation of domestic laws, 
including the constitutional provisions, should be aided by human 
rights norms, especially if such interpretation involves similar 
rights.  The Copyright Clause thus allows the insertion of 
pluralistic values into the copyright scheme, and interpretative 
procedures provide a positive mechanism to introduce the 
perceptions reflected in Article 27.  Moreover, another question is 
whether there is an alternative constitutional basis for introducing 
natural law philosophy into the intellectual property field, and 
furthermore, whether such circumvention of the Copyright Clause 
is possible.  According to Court, the circumvention of the 
Copyright Clause is permissible only if it results in an outcome 
that is not fundamentally inconsistent with the copyright scheme 
under the Copyright Clause.281  Therefore, an attempt to insert 
natural law considerations into American copyright law via an 
alternative constitutional basis, such as the Fifth Amendment’s 
protection over property rights, is not helpful because there is no 
escape from the need to answer the basic and internal question of 
whether the Copyright Clause can be interpreted as not rejecting 




281 See supra note 269. 
